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Abstract
For centuries the world has been plagued with conflict and violence that cause
destruction, population displacement, famine, hunger and outright chaos. As the image of
warfare has continually changed, internal conflict or civil wars became a more common
site. With the end of the cold war, the world has witnessed an increasing number of civil
strife enticing debates in the study of civil war on ‘new’ and ‘old’ wars and the
encouraging theories on civil war onset and duration.

The Middle East region is no stranger to the phenomena of civil war with the area itself
home to several conflicts. In 2011, the region ignited with rebellions against ruling
regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya. What started as revolutions
aiming for political change soon escalated to internal conflict. Six years into civil war the
conflict in Syria has left 400,000 people dead and millions seeking refuge across the
globe.

To understand the events of the Syrian Civil War and its possible outcomes, this research
project analyzes the dynamics of Syrian society, the historic relationship between the
different minorities and the regime and the role of the Ba’th Party in the creation of this
modern state. This is achieved through tracing the actions of the rebels and the regime in
mobilizing past grievances and the opportunities of greed that both have taken advantage
of.
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Introduction
One of the oldest states in the Middle East has been caught up in an ongoing civil
war for the last six years. What started as a local uprising against the Syrian Ba’th regime
and its current president Bashar-Al-Assad across several parts of the country has
escalated into a war between more than one opposing side that have left hundreds of
thousands of death and millions of refugees. With the involvement of many countries as
the war escalated and continued, the violence also increased and the attempts of conflict
resolution seem far out of reach. Countries such as Iran, Russia, the United States and
Saudi Arabia have taken the Syrian conflict as an arena to further spread their power.
Historically, Syria was not a unified state, it was forged out of the region known as
Greater Syria after WWI when it became part of the French Mandate.1 Out of the region
of Greater Syria, the modern states of Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and Syria were
established.2 The dynamics of the state and the history of its minority, elite and class
relations makes it an interesting case to study and further understand the reasons for civil
war onset but more importantly for the continuation and duration of violence. The goal of
this research is to analyze the factors that led the Syrian Uprising of 2011 to escalate into
a long civil war.
With the end of the Cold War, internal conflicts became a common sight around
the world. As rebellions, revolutions and military coups became common in modern
history, new fields of research in political science and theories on such phenomena

1

Roger Owen, State, power and politics in the making of the Modern Middle East
(London: Routledge, 2010).
2 Owen, State, power and politics.
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explored. Researchers began exploring and analyzing the differences between the types
of violence and the new kind of wars that were taking place in the 20th century.3
That being said scholars have been paying more attention to new types of conflicts,
especially civil wars, which have become more common since the fall of the Soviet
Union, “civil war is now far more common than international conflict: all of the 15 major
armed conflict listed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for 2001
were internal”.4 Scholars from different specializations were studying this new pattern in
violence from economic, sociological and anthropological points of view. Scholars like
Kaldor, Kalyvas and Vasquez5 studying to distinguish these new wars from previous ones
and mapping out the different political, economic and sociological factors that would
result in the onset, duration and intensity of such internal conflicts.6 New scholarly
research has been paying more attention to the theories beyond those of Collier and
Hoeffler who claimed, that rebel and opposition groups that engage in civil war are
merely after the economic profits that will result from the control of natural resources
within a state7. Another theoretical framework in the field of the study of civil wars, has
been paying attention to grievances experienced by groups within a state and play the role
of incentives for violence and conflict.8
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Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and grievance in civil war," Oxford Economic
Papers 56, no. 4 (2004):563, doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064.
5 John A. Vasquez, The war puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
6
Stathis N., Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006).
7 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”.
8 David Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence," in Greed & Grievance:
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000).
4

6

In 2011, The Middle East, a region with pre-existing and ongoing major conflicts
that has been overshadowing progress and development for many years, was struck by a
series of revolutions. The people of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Bahrain revolted
against their respective governments each with different yet similar demands. Fueled with
anger towards their leaders, the protestors demanded better standards of living, political
representation, democratic structuring of governments, elections, freedom of speech and
religious practices. Yet, these revolutions went different paths some leading to reforms
while others developed into civil wars. What we know globally as the Arab Spring might
have caused more damage and created more evil than good in of the countries where it
had started.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore and analyze a particular phenomenon
where the revolutions of the Arab Spring turned into a full on and ongoing civil war with
a high death toll and millions of refugees. A particular case study of interest is the Syrian
Civil War due to its capacity and large impact on not only the Middle East region, but
also the world as a whole. Through adopting a qualitative process-tracing approach of the
Syrian Civil War this thesis will determine the impact of greed and state repression on the
intensity and protraction of the war. This will be conducted through a historical analysis
of the Syrian regime and the dynamics at play within the society since the creation of the
Ba’th Party and the ascension of Hafiz Al-Asad to power.

7

Research Questions:
Two research questions guide the development of this thesis
1- What is the role of Greed in the protraction of violence and duration of the
Syrian Civil War?
2- How did Regime repression affect the escalation of violence during the
Syrian Uprising?
Hypotheses:
Scholars studying the phenomena of civil wars have been analyzing the different
economic, political and sociological factors that would lead to the onset of an internal
conflict. In order to be able to resolve these conflicts several questions on intensity and
duration of these conflicts must be addressed. Questions on how natural resources
influence civil war? Why do people rebel against their governments? What are the micro
and macro determinants of civil war? Are all valid questions. While some theories
particularly economic approaches that depend mainly on empirical evidence have been at
conflict or contradict other theories that aim to explain internal conflict in some cases.
The opportunities of greed were also opportunities of grievance, which intensified and
increased the duration of the conflict. Factors of anger and fear also play part in the
willingness of civilians to join in an armed conflict. With that in mind, for the purpose of
this thesis, the research and analysis will be focusing on the opportunities of greed that
influence the duration and intensity of the Syrian Civil War. The research will not only be
focusing on the greed that the rebels are seeking, but also the greed opportunities that the
government of Syria seeks to continue the fighting, rather than resolving it.9 The

9

David Keen, Useful enemies: when waging wars is more important than winning them
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).
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Hypotheses tested for this thesis to answer the research questions presented are as
follows:
Hypothesis One: Short Term Economic Functions of Violence and the International
War on ISIS has led to the protraction of the Civil War.
As the Syrian Civil War developed, research shows that three factors play a role in the
duration and protraction of violence. Using the military apparatus that has been at the
regime’s disposal and which is built on sectarian lines and was used to crush the rebellion
and thus increased the Greed opportunities that the regime seeks to continue the fighting.
The exploitation of the people and control of society and the economy shows that the
Syrian regime was prepared to fight and to escalate the level of violence in order to defeat
the uprising and maintain its survival. The ruling elite and supporters of the regime, either
participated or approved of the violence to maintain its economic status. Further, as the
war intensified, a factional split occurred within the opposition whom also wanted to
capitalize on the gains of a prolonged war, such as keeping aid money and looting.10
Finally, as the war developed and with the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria the flow of aid in
the form of weapons and Russian airstrikes has intensified the war leading to more
casualties and no sight of a lasting resolution. Foreign intervention also brought to light
old competition between the Sunni and Shia states’ particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia11
which meant that both sides wanted an opposing outcome to the war and thus this also
leads to the protraction of violence.

10

Emile Hokayem, Syria's uprising and the fracturing of the Levant (London: Routledge
for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013).
11
Marc Lynch, The Arab uprising: the unfinished revolutions of the new Middle East
(New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2013).
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Hypothesis Two: A combination of Top-Down and Bottom-Up escalation of
Violence intensify and prolong the War.12
Due to the patrimonial nature of the Syrian Regime and the polarization of the conflict, a
state of two warring sides, one that supports the uprising and another that supports the
military and the regime has led to a catastrophic escalation of violence. Historically,
Syrian society has been a fragmented one where Sunnis have been in power and often
barred the minorities from escalating. Yet with the fall of Greater Syria under the rule of
the French divisions between the inhabitants of the state were forged. After the Ottomans
lost WWI, and Greater Syria became known as the French Mandate the French operated
within the state with the policy known historically as “divide and rule”. The French
played minorities against each other, and often separated the minorities such as the
Druze, Alawites and other minorities by giving them autonomy. After Syria’s
independence and the rise of the Ba’th Party such divisions continued to play a major role
in the creation of the modern state of Syira. With the regime being built along sectarian
lines and the Alawi minority having all power, the mobilization of violence was possible
on both sides. Historically, the regime has used the sectarian and ethnic fragmentation of
the society to mobilize the people against the rebels. On the other side, the rebels were
able to mobilize Sunnis to join the conflict. As the conflict, continued anger and fear
created by the state led to mass murder and an unprecedented number of refugees.13
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David Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence," 24.
Elisabeth Jean Wood, "The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime
Transformation of Social Networks," Annual Review of Political Science 11, no. 1
(2008):545, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104832.
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Methodological Approaches:
While the field of Political Science has been concerned with the importance of
quantitative analysis and empirical evidence, the usage of qualitative analysis has often
been at doubt. Scholars were more concerned with the economic aspects of opportunity
and motivation of civil war onset but the qualitative aspects of the research have yet to
claim the same fame that was granted to quantitative research. For the purpose of this
thesis project the trajectory of the research will analyze the different incentives of
violence within the Syrian Civil War to understand the dynamics of the war and the
factors affecting its duration. To achieve this, I will be adopting a qualitative processtracing approach particularly, an outcome process-tracing approach in order to
understand why the outcome of the rebellion that started in 2011 became a protracted
civil war. I attempt to explain a case-specific historical outcome, rather than building or
testing a certain theory. This approach follows the same steps as those of the thesis,
paying attention to descriptive component of the case study and following how its events
unfolded. The usage of finding consequences and causation through this descriptive
technique is the foundation of the process-tracing process. Finally using this approach as
opposed to any other one gives me the chance to individually analyze the incentives of
violence of different actors in the civil war to understand why the rebellion turned
violent. That way I can analyze the events of the Civil War in more depth, analyzing the
different variables.14 The same approach will be utilized to breakdown the different
economic functions of violence and how each of the actors used these opportunities of

14

David Collier, "Understanding Process Tracing," PS: Political Science & Politics 44,
no. 04 (2011), doi:10.1017/s1049096511001429.
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‘greed’ to maintain the fighting and thus affect the duration of the civil war. Since this
conflict is ongoing and for the purpose of this research the period that will be analyzed
for this thesis will be from first of May 2011 in Deraa, up until February 2016 following
the attack on Aleppo and the involvement of the Russians in Air strikes.
Further a historical analysis of Syria will provide a coherent background to the
different cleavages present since the formation of the modern state that played a major
role at the start of the rebellion and then the civil war. The next chapter of this thesis will
explain and bring into perspective the literature on civil war and Syria in particular to
frame the history and hierarchy of the regime. The literature used for this thesis will rely
heavily on the usage of secondary sources that explain existing theories to understand the
development of the conflict. However, primary sources in the form of newspaper articles
that give first-hand accounts of the war will also provide information of the escalation of
the war and information on the different factors of duration. Chapter Two is a detailed
descriptive explanation of the creation of the modern state of Syria and how different
aspects of colonization have created a fragmented society. Chapter three will be an
analysis of the different incentives of violence that made the civil war possible to erupt,
through analyzing the dynamics of the relations between the regime and the local elite
and also the dynamics of the relation between the minorities and the opposition. Through
this analysis we can explain and understand why this civil war broke out in Syria as
opposed to breaking out in Tunisia or Egypt who have went through times of turmoil.
Further, chapter four will analyze in more detail the dynamics of the civil war and when
it became a full on war. The rest of the chapter will analyze the creation of a war
economy within Syria and process the different opportunities of ‘greed’ this new

12

economy provides to the different actors. This will provide for a better understanding of
the civil war duration. The chapter will also analyze the role of the international
community and the role of ISIS in the protraction of violence. Finally, the concluding
chapter will also discuss the limitations of the research and recommendation for future
research.
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CHAPTER ONE
Literature Review
“War is thus an Act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”
Carl Von Clausewitz
Violence, torture and war, are not new concepts to humans and thus studies
focusing on the occurrence and reoccurrence of violence help us understand better the
dynamics of such evets. For centuries humans have devised techniques to insert pain on
other humans for many reasons all which meant to show power. 15Violence, torture and
war are manifested in many events such as rebellion, revolution and civil wars. There is a
clear distinction between the three types and the purpose of this thesis project is study the
phenomena of civil wars in particular to understand the different factors of occurrence
and duration. In particular, this research project is focused on the case of study of the
Syrian Civil War which erupted months after the uprising of 2011, following the
movements of the Arab Spring. To better understand the dynamics of the Syrian Civil
War, it is important to investigate different approaches to the study of civil wars in
general. To trace the genealogy of the study on civil wars, this literature review will
analyze the work by Mary Kaldor on the ‘new’ vs ‘old’ war debate to outline the
difference between conventional wars and internal conflict which became common after
the end of the Cold War and many of the newly independent nations fell into ethnic
conflict16. Further, this review will address the work of Collier and Hoffeler on the
explanations of civil war onset through a ‘greed’ framework17. This leads to the different

15

Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (Malden, MA: WileyBlackwell, 2011), 5.
16
Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars, 6.
17
Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” 564.
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developments that took place within this framework to also include the work of David
Keen on ‘grievances’ vs. ‘greed’ and other scholarly research on opportunity and
motivations and the different incentives of violence in civil wars18.
1.1 They Study of Civil Wars
War and violence are not rare in human history, for long war was used as means
to coerce obedience, legitimacy or increase power and authority. According to Jack Levy
in his book on the “Causes of War” he has explicitly defined war as a “sustained violence
between political organizations.”19 Violence has been and always will bring about
destruction, although it might have been used to bring about change. War has easily
become a recognizable force of change of the world which we can use to explain the
creation of the concept of the modern nation state. “War made the state and the state
made war”20. It is no surprise that the world as it exists today will not be the same
without WWI, WWII or the Cold War. These wars have had a huge impact on the world
and the Middle East in particular. Historians understand that the treaties formed after the
fall of the Ottoman Empire, such as the Sykes-Picot treaty affects those living in the
Middle East and their relation with the West to this very day. In addition, despite being
the source for destruction, economy failure, famine, drought, death and
underdevelopment, there are those who find going to war and the use of violence as
acceptable. While the use of violence or the declaration of war might not seem to be a

18

David Keen, The economic functions of violence in civil wars (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998).
19
Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, 5.
20
Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of State Making,” in The Formation of
National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly et al. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press,1975).
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rational choice we must understand the reasons why some choose to join in the violence?
War becomes the means through which people can achieve that which might become
unachievable without the use of violence. Clausewitz in his book “On War” explains how
people might choose to wage war. In his definition of war, he outlines that it is a
“political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means, the political
object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in
isolation for their purpose.”21 Scholars have been interested when studying the topic of
war to understand why although war leads to destruction, involved actors choose to resort
to this option. Thus scholars studying this topic focus on the involvement of actors who
join war, these actors are organizations and not just individuals. Today war takes a whole
different direction with the usage of biological and chemical warfare and technology that
minimizes the number of soldiers on the ground and thus reducing casualties. Towards
the end of the 20th century war began to take a different dimension, shifting from
interstate wars to intra-state wars. What became known as ‘civil wars’ was a type of
internal conflict that began to rise in occurrence from 1945 lasting to the late 1990s,22
declining in number but not diminishing all together. According to research from the
years “1945-1999, 146 civil wars have taken place.”23 In their scholarly work on civil
wars Fearon and Laitin pointed to the death toll of civil wars fought after WWII as being

21

Carl Von Clausewitz and F. N. Maude, On War (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1962),
87 .
22
Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Civil Wars,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, ed.
Carles Boix et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
23
Carles Boix and Susan Carol. Stokes, The Oxford handbook of Comparative Politics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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estimated at 16.2 million deaths.24 Such a catastrophic series of events marked the end of
colonization and the collapse of the existing hegemony of the Eastern hemisphere, the
Soviet Union, and the remaining of one power, the United States. With the end of the
Cold War the study and research of civil war has become a common topic, amongst
policy and political science scholars dedicating research to the field.
It is important to point out that in order to identify a certain internal conflict as a
civil war, there must have been a specific threshold crossed. According to the “Correlates
of War Project” (COW Project), there has to be at least 1,000 battle related deaths among
all participants and an annual average of 1,000 battle related deaths for wars lasting more
than a year.25 It is very important to define the term civil war to be able to understand the
factors of this research and its conclusions. “Civil war can be defined as the armed
combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity subject to a
common authority at the outset of hostilities.”26 While there is an ongoing debate of what
determines a civil war, this research is going to adopt the approach where a conflict
within a state that has resulted in the death of 1,000 people will be taken into account as a
civil war, to distinguish between this conflict and other violent acts such as riots,
massacres and genocide.27 Further while there are many kinds of political violence such
as riots, genocide and terrorism; a clear distinction can be made if we analyze the goals to
be achieved from each kind of violence. “A ‘revolution’ is an attempt by an insurgent
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James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,"
American Political Science Review 97, no. 01 (2003): 75,
doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534.
25
Marie Olson Lounsbery and Frederic S. Pearson, Civil wars: internal struggles, global
Consequences (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
26
Stathis, Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence, 5.
27
Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, 565.
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group to overthrow the government and fundamentally change or reorient the political
system. While a ‘coup d’etat’ is a military takeover that seeks to replace a government or
its leaders.” 28 Unlike revolutions and coups, the unique feature of a civil war is that one
of the two sides engaging in the violence must be a sovereign entity while the other
offensive side is a rebel group. While there can be more than two competing sides in this
militarized conflict, “a domestic challenge directed against the authority of the current
holder of sovereign authority, which distinguishes it from interstate war.” 29
Scholars studying the phenomena of civil wars have been analyzing the different
economic, political and sociological factors that would lead to the onset of an internal
conflict. Scholars were interested in studying a kind of “symmetric” war where both
warring sides were equal in strength and equal in weaponry types and power. 30 These
were the first generation of researchers who were concerned with framing political
violence using structural causes to explain civil wars and guerrilla warfare.31 In order to
be able to resolve these conflicts or to prevent them from happening scholars had to
understand the characteristics of such wars and analyze the different variables that
influence the onset, intensity and duration of these conflicts. Research was led by
questions on how natural resources influence civil war? Why do people rebel against
their governments? What are the micro and macro determinants of civil war? These
questions led to many theories and conceptual frameworks that have developed over the
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Lounsbery and Pearson, Civil wars: internal struggles, global consequences,14.
Kalyvas, “Civil Wars”, 417. .
30
Stathis Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud, Order, Conflict, and
Violence,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2008).
31
Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud, Order, Conflict, and Violence.
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years since researchers took interest in such events of internal upheaval. The onset of the
Syrian Civil War in 2011, has generated a lot of research in order to understand the
dynamics of the civil war and the factors that play in its increased duration. Following
suit with the Arab Spring, Syria after a year of violence and protesting did not reach a
stable state as with other neighboring countries. On the other hand, the country has since
been in turmoil with many failed attempts at resolving the conflict. While Syrian Civil
war did not occur due to conflict over a natural resource; other incentives of violence
were at play. Marginalization of the rural area, and favoritism of the urban cities created
tension over the years as Bashar Al-Asad came to power.32 As the regime responded
repressively at the first sight of dissident activities, many incentives of violence were
capitalized thus pushing the country into a state of civil war. With the first months of the
uprising, many army generals defected along with soldiers and heavy army weaponry.
This created a state where both opposing forces were capable of fighting and the
destruction that occurred created further violence along sectarian lines.33 Other dynamics
came into play and the alliance of the rebels with terrorist organizations created a whole
new level of violence and new capabilities given the elevated strength of the rebels.34
Legitimate reasons for rebellion were no longer part of the civil war, rather violence
occurred due to a difference in ideologies. With this new phase of the civil war, the
international community took part in the conflict and its implications increased the
duration of the war; as many attempts at peace-pacts failed. As a result, today more than
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Bassam Haddad, Business Networks in Syria the Political Economy of Authoritarian
Resilience (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012),13.
33
Emile Hokayem, Syria’s uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant (London:
Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013).
34
Hokayem, Syria’s uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant.
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400,000 people were killed and 5 million registered as refugees, according to the latest
UN reports on the conflict.35
Originally, research mostly dedicated to the study of internal conflict during the
60s and 70s was focused on understanding and explaining political violence in general.
They focused on studying rebellions and revolutions that often turned into civil wars.36
Motivated to rebel, those who participated in such conflicts and restored to the use of
violence have always been pushed by poverty that had surpassed certain thresholds of
famine and hunger such as the revolutionaries during the Russian revolution in the early
20th century. Yet, scholars were able to theorize that these revolutions were not started by
those who were dying from poverty but it was led by those who had an improvement in
their living standard and that continuation of progress was retracted or blocked. But no
consensus was reached on this matter and so it became problematic in academia.37
With the changing image of warfare and the increase in civil wars where the state
was no longer the only warring side against another state, but rather the state is fighting
not only one rebel group but many different ones with different interest, and motivations.
The research on civil wars increased. This approach was adopted by modernization
scholars who traced rebellion to economic factors of inequality.38 These scholars believe
that with the spread of globalization a gap was created causes great economic
inequalities. Further, as globalization shaped the world into a more tech savvy and open
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Kenneth Roth, Syria. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2017, accessed July 14, 2017,
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Routledge, 2014),15.
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space, more and more people who wanted to enjoy the same freedoms of those in the
Western hemisphere began to demand more political participation and rights, thus
shifting the existing status –quo leading in many cases to the eruption of violence and
thus the onset of civil war. Another development in academia on civil wars came with the
rise of civil wars erupting in recently independent Eastern European states and across the
globe. With this new line in the research scholars began to reference civil wars in terms
of ethnic conflict.39
Many of these civil wars were identified by scholars as “identity” or “ethnic”
wars, and were identified as “asymmetric” where the state power outmatched that of the
rebel groups. In his book, “Ethnic Groups in Conflict”, Horowitz explains that the ethnic
composition of the military and police is a resource in the conflict40. Explaining that
while the military or other coercive apparatus used by the state to control or disperse
ethnic riots or rebellions, this particular ethnic composition intensifies the violence. “The
army favors one group or another in its interventions may exacerbate the violence.”41
Here the term ‘Civil War’ began to take a more political weight. As the media began to
report on the events of such wars, it was evident that many of the media sources would
have a certain political agenda to push and often using this term or denying its usage was
either giving legitimacy or denying it to a warring group.42 The common occurrence of
such conflicts led to a later line development in the scholarly research on the topic to
analyze yet another change in this kind of warfare with the turn of the century. A later
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line of this debate in analyzing the changing image of warfare with the turn of the
century, became known as the “Old Wars” and “New Wars”43 debate proposed by Mary
Kaldor. According to Kalyvas and Balcells in their scholarly work published in 2009,
they divide civil wars into three different categories to be investigated. They find that
civil wars are either Asymmetric, where the state is stronger than the rebels44. The second
type of civil war is conventional where both sides are equally strong and have equal
levels of military technology. Finally, the third category is where rebels have low access
to military technology and use tactics of unconventional combat. This last category was
manifested in the debate of ‘old wars’ vs. ‘new wars’. In her work Kaldor identifies “Old
Wars” as being motivated by geopolitical or ideological politics that aim to make
territorial and convectional war claims. They are identified through their hierarchal
organization of fighters and are financed through centralized means. On the other hand,
her analysis of “New Wars” were manifested as wars based on identity politics which
often re-create a past glorious identity that once was to claim legitimacy. Such “New
Wars” recruit exclusive sectors mobilizing around ethnic or religious and radical
identities that further cause fragmentation thus leading to a protraction of violence.
Unlike “Old War”, these wars are fought in an unconventional way through gangs,
guerilla warfare, who play on the fear of others to gain legitimacy and momentum. Due
to the unique factor of being transcendent across borders, New Wars rely on external
resources, local resources and other forms of greed to finance the fighting.45

43

Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
Laia Balcells and Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and
Outcomes of Civil Wars," SSRN Electronic Journal (2014) doi:10.2139/ssrn.2206324.
45
Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
44

22

This debate inspired another theoretical approach led by David Keen in 1998,
which argued that “civil wars were being waged not to capture but to make money. Thus
winning wars became less important.” 46 This became known as the greed-motivation
theory. More recent scholarly research has led to emphasizing the role of greed,
grievance, motivation and opportunity. Theorists of greed question whether rebels would
go to war to gain control of loot-able resources or if they became dependent on these
resources to finance the conflict? Both Soysa and Ross, in their scholarly work derived
that resources were not the motivation for civil war onset yet their existence increased the
duration of the war.47 Thus the literature on civil wars outlines a new debate which
became known as the “greed vs. grievance” theories. Yet, although grievances do explain
the existence of economic and social and ethnic inequalities, these do not explain alone
why or when a civil war would occur. 48 Scholars studying the aftermath of the Arab
Spring were interested in studying the outcomes of the rebellion in Libya. According to
Wim Van Doorn’s work on the “‘Greed’ and ‘Grievances’ as Motivations for Civil War:
The Libya Case”, he analyzes whether Greed or Grievances were the factors of onset in
civil war49. He finds that grievances were present in Libyan society and in 2011, they
found a way to finally express them. Yet, the greed framework does not explain why the
civil war in Libya broke out; instead he finds that both ‘greed’ and ‘grievances’ explain
the onset of the civil war, only when we look to study the individual motivations and
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opportunities that were presented to the rebels to fight against the regime. Van Doorn
concluded that the economic agendas present themselves from “opportunity” provided
during the rebellion, and that also opportunity combined with grievances make the
chances of civil war the highest.50
Finally, the latest development in this field has led to the importance of analyzing and
focusing on opportunity as manifested in the work published in 2003 by Fearon and
Laitin51. This new approach finds another dimension to the conflict manifested in
transnational rebel groups which gives the conflict a new dimension. 52 With this
understanding and awareness of the genealogy of the literature on civil wars we can
derive that while civil wars often occur in states where pre-existing grievances such as
poverty, lack of political participation and severe inequalities can be detected it is hard to
account for where a civil war will occur next. A combination of motivation and
opportunity perceived by different parts of a given society members, accompanied with a
perception of fear and threat makes it more likely that such a conflict will occur. Yet
there remains a problem. “Inconsistences in the coding within the same datasets,
problematic data from civil wars: most civil wars take place in improvised countries
where record-keeping bureaucracies are lacking.”53 This problem with coding leads to
questioning whether civil wars are actually an independent occurrence or if they are a
factor or a single value in a much larger phenomena being that of political violence.
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Processing the events of the Syrian Civil War with an understanding of the distinction
between “New” and “Old” wars we can analyze the effect of greed manifested through
the rebels and the state who mobilized different and pre-existent ethnicities to increase
the duration of the war. The debate on ‘New’ and ‘Old’ wars finds that ‘New Wars’ are
motivated by identity politics and are mobilized around ethnic, religious and racial
identity to claim power.54 After the Arab Spring movement, many of the countries that
witnessed the breakout of rebellion have fallen into the abyss of civil wars. In order to
understand further the factors that lead to a break out of civil war in the Middle East and
particularly in Syria, we must understand that the civil war there cannot be easily framed
as one that was motivated by sectarian or identity politics alone. In the context of what
was happening in the Arab world, the protests that started in Syria were motivated by
ideological and political agendas; namely looking for more economic reform in
improvised area in the countryside and political freedom. Therefore, although some
research generated since the start of the conflict would dismiss it as a sectarian war
making this distinction shows that it is not. However, we cannot deny that later on when
the regime responded to these protests with violence; and began deploying Alawi militia
in Sunni majority areas the conflict began to take a more sectarian identity.55 Therefore,
we must be able to make a clear distinction between the first few days of the uprising,
and a few months later when the regime began labelling the protestors as ‘terrorists’, and
calling itself the ‘protector of the minorities thus framing the conflict as a war between
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the Alawis and the Sunnis.56 A number of studies have recently focused on the micro
foundations of the mobilization tactics, the role of patronage networks and even emotions
in the study of rebellions.57 Thus my research will add to that trajectory by analyzing the
different incentives of violence in the Syrian civil war that were present due to the
different networks of patronage and methods of mobilization that led to the war. Tracing
the historical formation of Syria and the uprising will provide us with more data on the
dynamics of the conflict and its duration.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
A popular framework used by scholars to explain civil war and internal conflicts
has been the mechanisms of Greed and Grievance theories through which Collier and
Hoeffler used three study points of Greed and Four points of Grievance to explain the
determinants of such wars58. According to their research “Greed and Grievance in Civil
War” they came to the conclusion that motives of greed by rebel groups to acquire the
profit of obtaining and selling nature resources best explains why civil wars take place.
Yet, this theory was criticized by scholars such as Keen, in his book “Complex
Emergencies” published in 2008, that greed alone is not sufficient to explain the motives
of the actors involved, rather there has to exist a set of grievances such as inequalities in
the distribution of wealth, a disintegration of the political structure or an ethnic conflict
that would lead to the onset of a civil war59. Based on the arguments of Collier in his
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works, this theory is derived from the school of rational thought, whereas the greed
theory is mainly for opportunity gains. “The greed theory is an economic theory that
assumes that the control resources if for the purpose of personal gains. The conflict then
is started when leaders or groups sought after taking control of a natural resource with the
goal or capitalizing of private or personal profits”.60 According to the theory, conflict is
reflected in the competition between groups over controlling loot-able resources. In that
sense, a civil war will occur when a rebel group fighting against a government has access
to rents. Thus the presence of opportunities of greed will lead to an onset of a civil war,
extend its duration and the intensity of that conflict. Collier’s research stands on the
assumption that rebel-groups will disguise their true intentions for controlling resources
with support for grievances that might exist within a certain society. The greed
explanation assumes three aspects of opportunity, the financing of the insurgency, the
recruitment of insurgency and the geography that allows the insurgency to spread and
make gains. While the existence of a natural resource does increase the ability of a certain
group to finance a rebellion, aid from the international community can satisfy that
variable in the situation where a natural resource is not present such as with the case of
Syria. Therefore, while studying civil wars we must understand why do people choose to
use arms and violence rather than more diplomatic measures or more peaceful tactics. A
way to understand this is to look at two variables adopted by Gurr in his book “Why do
Men Rebel?”. The first variable being “potential for collective violence” and the second
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variable being “potential for political violence”61. The first variable is a function of the
extent and intensity of shared discontent among members of society, while the second
variable is the function of the degree to which such discontents are blamed on the
political system and its agents. Different types of methods to approach the pressing
argument of whether greed factors or grievances within a state are the determinants of
civil war. While some theories, particularly economic approaches that depend mainly on
empirical evidence have been at conflict or contradict other theories that aim to explain
internal conflict in some cases.
The opportunities of greed, were also opportunities of grievance which intensified
and increased the duration of the conflict. Factors of anger and fear also play part in the
willingness of civilians to join in an armed conflict. With that in mind, for the purpose of
this thesis, the research and analysis will be focusing on the opportunities of greed that
influence the duration and intensity of the Syrian Civil War. The research will not only be
focusing on the greed that the rebels are seeking, but also the greed opportunities that the
government of Syria seeks to continue the fighting, rather than resolving it.62 As scholars
we are concerned with “the explanation of conflict in terms of motive: the circumstances
in which people want to rebel are viewed sufficiently rare to continue explanation”.63 For
the purposes of proofing the hypotheses this thesis carefully analyzes to understand how
the Syrian Uprising escalated to become a full on civil conflict, with a near death toll of
three-hundred thousand people. In a case such as the Syrian Civil War the potential and
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magnitude for both collective and political violence was high given the circumstances
that had been playing before and during the conflict with the failure of the political
system, and the many grievances felt by the people were seen as a result of the
authoritarian Assad regime. The macro-analysis of the determinants of the extent of
violence leads to an understanding of the onset, intensity and duration of the conflict.”64
Whether violence is used as a motive for destruction or as a motive to reach an ends of
building a new system out of the ashes of an older one, the Syrian Civil War has many
aspects that determine the intensity and duration of this internal war. The duration and
intensity of a civil war can be traced back to the economic interests that were created and
ended in chaos. Despite what some people might think of civil war being against
rationality, it is in particular this chaotic status of war that can be used to further benefit
someone’s agenda. According to David Keen in his book “The Economic Functions of
Violence in Civil Wars” economic interests are the push factors behind the protraction of
violence whether it is top-down violence that is spurred by leaders and the regime or
bottom-up violence that is created and mobilized through rebels or civilians joining in the
chaos65. Essentially, the continuation of the conflict can be traced back to these benefits
and thus the protraction of violence becomes the goal of the war.
1.3 Conflicts in the Middle East and the Syrian Civil War
The Middle East as a region has experienced many conflicts, particularly ones
that date back to 1948 with the creation of the state of Israel. The Arab-Israeli conflict
has shaped a lot of the policies and the relations between the states within the Middle
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East and even the whole region and the rest of the world. The region has also been
witness to several civil wars some of which have continued to erupt even after they were
resolved such as the civil war in Sudan and also ethnically motivated civil wars as the one
in Lebanon in the late 1970s. The case of the conflict in the Sudan was a resource greed
motivated conflict emphasizing the arguments of Hoffeler and Collier on Lootable
resources and civil war onset66. The discovery of oil in the South led the North to attack
and to acquire the oil for itself. While the North might have found the opportunity to
attack the South by mobilizing pre-existing religious and sectarian grievances, they were
motivated to attack after the discovery of a natural-resource such as oil. “The grievances
of the Sudan’s people, especially those in the ‘marginalized areas of south, west and east
pre-date the development of the oil sector, but oil has exacerbated political mobilization
on all sides. Since Sudan’s oil came in stream in 1999 it has increasingly resembled the
predatory state model.” 67 On the other hand, the civil war in Lebanon was quiet different
in nature although quiet similar to the current conflict in Syria. Although framed as an
example of sectarian violence, the civil war in Lebanon was more of a fight for political
power. “The conflict lasted for 15 years, cost 150,000 lives, left 300,000 injured and led
to the emigration of almost a million people, nearly brought the Lebanese state to a
collapse.” 68 As Christian militia clashed with the PLO that had recently arrived to the
state, the opportunity for violence was manifested in the sectarian divisions that existed
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since the creation of Lebanon under the rule of the French Mandate in 1920. Like “New
Wars” these opportunities accompanied with fear and ideas on restoring and saving a past
glory of the Maronite’s being in power, led to the mobilization of such ethnic differences
that eventually added to the bloodshed and protraction of violence69. While the Lebanese
and current Syrian civil war are quiet similar, the Syrian conflict is unique that the events
in Syria that had started as a rebellion against the regime escalated into a civil war unlike
neighboring states in the Arab world such as Egypt and Tunisia with similar
characteristics. The Syrian Civil War is not a case-study where only grievances or greed
were manifested, rather both played different roles with the conflict. Past grievances of
the rural population were methods of mobilization during the first months of the uprising,
and the regime motivated by its patrimonial nature also mobilized ancient sectarian
differences to rally up its supporters mainly consisting of Alawis and other minorities. As
the civil war dynamics shifted and terrorist organizations infiltrated the opposition
opportunities of greed were manifested in looting aid money, controlling some oil fields
and capitalizing on fighting terror to stay in power. Thus, this project aims at situating the
Syrian Civil War in the larger framework of this new approach in the study of civil wars;
to understand the incentives of violence whether manifested through grievances or greed.
The Arab world witnessed mass uprisings, specifically in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya,
Syria and Yemen. The regimes in Tunisia, Egypt Libya and Yemen broke down in the
few months following the Arab uprisings, yet the Syrian regime held on to power which
later led to the onset of civil war. In an interview where Bashar al-Assad, was asked
whether he thinks that the demonstrations ripping through Tunisia and Egypt toppling
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both the Mubarak and Ben-Ali regimes would be spreading through to Syria, he denied
stating that while there has been slow progress and economic hardships, the regime has
been working to fix the problems and the people would not be following that trend of
revolting. In fact it was surprise to both the Regime, Syrians, analysts and policy makers
that such a movement has caught on in the country.70 This surprise was due to the smooth
transfer of power from father-to son in 2000 that the regime was able to survive that they
would withstand such turmoil in the region.71 Looking closely at the Syrian Uprising one
finds that it is extremely complex and that could somehow explain the trajectory that the
conflict took in opposition to other revolutions happening in neighboring countries.
While Syrians might have not intentionally saw themselves as a sectarian society72, the
Syrians society is divided along some line of ethnicity (refer to figure 1). The majority of
the country being Sunni is being ruled by an Alawi minority which the Assad regime
belongs too. These divisions came to light since the Alawi minority was much in control
of the security apparatus and militia.73
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Figure 1.Map showing Syrian Ethnic Divisions74

1.4 Uprising to Civil War
The Syrian uprising began in March 2011, when a group of teenagers in the city of Daraa
were arrested and tortured after writing anti-regime graffiti. Although the regime declared
that there will be reforms, Sunni-majority cities continued to revolt against the regime as
police crackdown continued. As this mobilization continued both from the regime and the
people factions started to play part in society, with defectors from the Syrian military
announced the formation of Free Syrian Army dedicated to fighting and toppling the
regime.75 As the conflict continued many rebel groups began to emerge (refer to figure 2)
and as the number of deaths toppled the conflict seems to be very distant from any sort of
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resolution. Thus as researchers we should understand the uniqueness of the Syrian Civil
War and how it falls in the current literature on the topic of internal conflict itself.

Figure 2. Map of rebel group and government controlled cities in the Civil War76

As described by many news agencies the Syrian Civil War can be traced into
being two civil wars or having two distinct phases. The first being the escalation of
violence from an uprising where the grievances of a population divided by sectarian lines
and loyalty to a political party in control 77 and the second phase, or a second civil war as
described by the media starts with the involvement of ISIS in November 201378. Why has
the Syrian Uprising developed from protesting against the Assad regime, to become a
civil war that continues to exist today since 2011? Despite the Arab Spring protests

76

"Syria's Civil War Explained," Al Jazeera, December 14, 2016.
Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad
and the Baʻth Party (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).
78
Martin Chulov et al."Syria's Civil War: Five Years of Guardian Reporting." The
Guardian, March 14, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/syria-civilwar-five-years-guardian-reporting.
77

34

spreading across to different nations, the Syrian Uprising has developed in a trajectory of
its own. While grievances experienced by the Syrian people can explain the onset of the
civil war as one understands and analyzes these determinants, we can’t help but wonder
why it continues and all chances at resolving the conflict have failed. With the end of
seize fire in cities such as Aleppo and Homs prospects of conflict resolution diminish.
This research project is concerned with the trajectory that the Syrian Uprising has taken
and an attempt to understand and analyze the determinants of duration and intensity of
the Syrian Civil War. In his book “Useful Enemies: When waging wars is more important
than winning them”. David Keen challenges a traditional view of civil war as a
destruction of a previous system and a fight between two different sides as to who will
end up winning. Rather he argues that in some wars “winning has taken a back seat.”79
War systems as he calls them instead of simply saying war; as he finds it more
appropriate as chaos and destruction are not the goal of such conflicts but it’s to gain
profit, serve as ultimate opportunity to make certain gains and satisfy components of
greed. These opportunities of greed can be traced back to securing protection money from
elite groups, securing international aid, gained military benefits and status, or pillage in
the form of controlling resources to pay off soldiers. Further, as Keen suggested in his
book, efforts of counter-insurgency might also serve as factors of greed to protract the
civil war as a government starts labelling a certain group as terrorists or an imminent
threat to civilians to be able to stall elections.
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Tracing the phases of the civil war in Syria to determine the effect of the Syrian
regime, the grievances of the people, the greedy rebels, insurgency and greedy outsiders80
will add to the understanding of the topic and particularly to understand the internal war
in Syria and lead to its resolution. The use of violence of escalation could be at many
time an irrational decision given that two factors at combat or disagreement might want
to cooperate to maintain the status quo.81 Yet there are many determinants to why certain
states would choose to use repression and escalate violence towards non-combatant
protestors. Such of these would be regime type, the institutional structure of the
government at question, the coercive apparatus of the regime, its abidance with
international law and the importance of human rights in the eyes of that particular regime
as opposed to its fear from repercussions of the international community.82 Using this
theoretical framework to analyze the escalation of violence this thesis aims to reach a
conclusion on the hypotheses of the change of the Syrian Uprising from a revolution to
an internal war as opposed to other Arab Spring countries. Following the framework of
the study of civil wars will help in determining the different incentives of violence with
the Syrian Civil War and how it was used as tactics for mobilization both by the regime
and the opposition. The arguments on greed and grievances will also guide this research
to make conclusions about the factors that led to the civil war to occur; such as the past
grievances of Sunnis in the security forces; which give the opportunity many of them
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defected from the army and the improvement and alienation of the rural areas as a result
of the failed economic liberalization policies that were hindered by conflicting ideologies
and patronage politics. In addition, economic agendas that were present as the civil war
continued will give more details on the many greed opportunities that the rebels utilize to
further prolong the war. The second chapter of the thesis will trace the historical
formation of the Syrian state particularly under the French mandate to understand further
the dynamics of the relationship between the different sects living with the nation state
and how that relationship could pose as a war threat in the future. Further, the chapter
also examines the politics of the formation of the Ba’th Party and the policies of Hafiz
Al-Asad on the Syrian state.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CREATION OF THE SYRIAN STATE: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
“The Syria that we know today is in some sense ‘a residual entity’; it is the Syria of what
is left after all such acts of dismemberment”83
Nazih Ayubi
Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire after the Triple Alliance lost the war,
the British and the French divided the area of the Levant amongst themselves. As the
Allies emerged victories, Woodrow Wilson the US president proposed fourteen points to
preserve peace in Europe and end all wars. Wilson’s fifth point was dedicated to the
independence of the colonies. “A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment
of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining
all such questions of sovereignty, the interests of the populations concerned must have
equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be
determined.”84 Wilson’s speech on the self-determination of the colonies meant that
colonies such as those under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, would gain independence
and enjoy self-rule. Such speech worried the French and the British who appeared to have
no intention of doing so. In 1916, the French and the British secretly drew up an
agreement known as the Sykes-Picot Treaty that divided territory that was once under the
rule of the Ottomans to fall under the sphere of influence of the British and French.85 The
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French controlled the northern part of the Levant, while the British created a mandate in
Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Palestine. While the mandates were supposed to have equal rights
and not under occupation, the French practiced the same legacies of control and
colonization as they had done for years in their French colonies. Under the mandate
system proposed by the League of Nations the land once known as ‘Greater Syria’ was
divided along religious and ethnic lines. Today, in its place stands the independent
nation-states of Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Syria gained independence in 1946
only after the French were destroyed during WWII and they could no longer control the
rise of the Syrian nationalist movements and continuous rebellions. Since independence,
the new state lacked politicked stability where Syria witnessed several military coups and
a fight for power. Following aspirations to unit all Arabs, Egypt and Syria formed a union
only to be broken three years after it was forged in 1958. The split from Egypt gave
power to the Ba’th Party that has previously lost contact with the people due to the
recommendations of Gamal Abdul-Nasser who called for the disbanding of all Syrian
parties during the unification with Egypt. The Arab-Israeli war had a catastrophic impact
on Syria, when they lost the Golan Heights to Israel. Using this turbulent time, one of the
military generals, Hafiz Al-Asad was able to rise to power and consolidated in power the
Alawite minority and military control. Following his death, his son, Bashar Al-Asad took
over power by popular referendum in 2000. Despite the stability that the military control
established when Al-Asad came to power, Syria remained a fragmented society. Inspired
by the events happening in the Middle East in 2011, Syrians too revolted against the
government and Al-Asad. Yet, unlike neighboring states of Tunisia and Egypt, the Syrian
revolution escalated to a Civil War.
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2.1 Territory and Religion
Geographically Syrian territory is divided by the Taurus Mountains to its north,
the Mediterranean in the West and to its east stretches the desert across which lies the
borders with Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.86 To its Arab inhabitants this land was known
by its Arabic name of “Sham”, meaning north. It was the Greek and the Romans who had
named it Syria, yet in the 20th century when the modern state of Syria was established
both the Arabs and the West adopted the latter name. From the North to the South the
land stretches 800km and 480km in width. 87 The terrain compromises of mountains, a
coastal zone, and a large eastern area that includes mountains and vast deserts. Despite its
access to the coast, Syria does not have a water source that unifies the country together as
opposed to Egypt and Iraq. The Syrian society was splintered and never unified under
one government. Thus, Syrians never saw themselves as one Syrian nation. Thus, cities
and towns in Syria were not concerned with a unified national identity or nationalistic
loyalty to their state. Therefore, scholars do not view Syria as one political entity “it
never acquired political form as a single state containing only Syria and nothing else,
Syria was always a province of an empire elsewhere.”88
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Figure 3. Map showing Greater Syria prior to divisions by the French in
1920 from “Greater Syria: The History of Ambition.”89

Those residing in the cities and towns were loyal to their families, sect and area of
residence whether in large cities or rural areas. While there existed an internal bond
between the different ethnic and religious groups they lived separately in towns that were
dominated by a single group of people. During times of uncertainty these different groups
segregated themselves and build barricaded cities where the Muslims, Christians and
Jews lived separately. The inclusive loyalty to the location of birth was manifested in the
rivalry between Damascus and Aleppo for power. Damascus, the current Syrian capital,
has always been important politically, socially and economically. Situated in the northern
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region, Damascus became the capital of the Islamic world, when armies from central
Arabia conquered the city and with it started an Islamic identity to the city. Built on the
ruins of the Greco-Roman city, Damascus remained the capital until it became a province
when the Caliphate was moved to Baghdad in 750AD.90 The city continued to flourish
with a distinct Islamic identity but in 1920 it fell into the hands of the French in return
imposing their identity on the city. On the other hand, Aleppo developed as an important
economic and trading center due to its geographical location, neighboring Anatolia.
Gradually, the city was given its autonomy, and at other times incorporated with other
territories. Even when it became part of modern Syria, and in 1918 was considered a
second capital to the Syrian republic, Aleppo never lost its independent identity. 91 Other
regions such as the cities of Homs and Hama in the North-East also flourished and have
become the grass-roots for important families in Syrian politics, acting as rivals to the
status of Damascus.
Another manifestation of the regional and sectarian loyalties is the dedicated
loyalty in Syria to religious identity. Syrian society encompasses of Sunni Arabs, Shia,
Ismailis, Alwaites, Druze, and Christian Orthodox. Scholars have described the ethnically
and religiously plural polities of the Levant as “The Mosaic State” (Al-Dawla-alFusaifisiyya)92. While this image might not be entirely perfect because of the Sunni Arab
majority residing in the Levant, the region is home to various religious minorities.
Christianity flourished in the region in the city under the Byzantines until 643AD.93 Islam
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then spread across the regions when the Arabs conquered the Levant and Islam became
the dominant religion in the Greater Syria. The Grand Mosque of Damascus served as the
leading position in Islamic traditions. In the provinces and other towns Islam took a less
intellectual and was a more popular form of religion that was connected to the local saints
and thus became more dominant. Sunnis make up around 74% of the population and are
not limited to a particular region in the state. Other Muslim groups make up around 13%
of the population. The Alawites are Syria’s largest minority. Also known as Nusayri;
descendants of a local tribe that prevailed in the 9th century live in Latakia. Historically,
the Alawites were poor farmers who lived in Jabal- Al Nusayriyyah, near Latakia. Their
religion is a combination of pre-Islamic features, Shi’ism and Christian elements as they
had converted from Christianity to Islam. Another Muslim minority living in Syria are
the Druze, who make up around 3% of the population. The Druze community can be
located around the area of the Levant in Syria, Lebanon and Israel, yet they are mainly
concentrated in Jabal Al Druze. Although they derive from a Muslim sect, the Druze
identify and are viewed by others as Arabs but not Muslim as they are seen by Sunnis as
heretics. Finally, Christians live mainly in Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus they
make up around 10% of Syria’s population. For long Orthodox Syrians have been
governed by the Greek patriarch in Constantinople. Yet an important change that took
place in the 19th century marked an era where Arab nationalism was on the rise, when
they successfully elected an Arab patriarch in Damascus.
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2.2 Syria under Ottoman Rule
The history of Syria under the Ottomans was important in the formation of the
Modern state. During the rule of the Ottomans which began in 1516, after ending
Mamluk rule in Syria many institutions were created that slowly shaped the dynamics of
Syrian society today. Under the Ottoman rule Damascus became an administrative center
of the empire and slowly the Ottomans instilled the Turkish language and governed their
tradition. While Syrian society remained Arab and Muslim, slowly there was created a
sense of being part of the empire and being Ottoman. Changes in neighboring Egypt
directly influence Ottoman rule over Syria. After Muhammed Ali took over power in
Egypt his son Ibrahim invaded and occupied Syria during the years 1831-1840. He
expelled the Ottomans and introduced many reforms that followed suit those that his
father was implementing in Egypt. During his rule Ibrahim was able to introduce a
central administration, collect taxes and conscript Syrians into his armies. Further, he
created local administrative councils on which both Christians and Jews were
represented. As large-scale economic and agricultural development took way in Syria,
Ibrahim opened up routes for trade with the European market and soon European goods
and ideas began to flow within the region. The emergence of European-modelled
institutions in Syria gave way for European influence in the region. The first sign of
European influence came through the era of the Tanzimat from the 1800-1840. This was
evident in “bureaucratic centralization, registration of land ownership, the building of
new armies, modern educational systems, and the attempt to create the control of the
government over the economy and to maximize tax revenue were the main aspects of
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reforms.”94 While the era of the Tanizmat or reform intended to deviate European
influence from the region and to appease the minorities in the Ottoman Empire, the
opposite result took place and the Europeans found ways to intervene in the affairs of the
Ottoman Empire, and the French particularly meddled in the region of Greater Syria. The
European missions that intervened in local affairs began opening schools and colleges,
offering western education to students whom were mainly Christians. They later offered
protection to religious groups and minorities all the while their moves upset the existing
traditional balance. During this time Muslims were upset that the Christians were gaining
the most from European intervention. This opened the way for the French to claim
influence over Syria. After overthrowing Ibrahim with the help of the British, the
Ottomans came revived their control over Greater Syria. Due to the weakened power of
the Ottomans and the authoritarian rule that Othman imposed on the Syrians, a process
for independence began. “In 1913 an Arab congress met in Paris, calling for greater
participation in the reformed affairs of the Empire.”95 Yet the First World War didn’t
allow them to implement their aims. As WWI came to an end the Sykes-Picot agreement
recognized French influence in Syria and Lebanon. While the British controlled
Palestine, Iraq and Jordan. Thus the road to breaking up Greater-Syria was under way.
2.3 Syria under French Rule
The French rule over Syria was the most critical in the history of the region.
Following the end of WWI, the French claimed authority over the Levant and used their
previous influence and relation with the minorities, particularly Christian minorities to
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claim legitimacy. Originally, the mandate system approved by the League of nations was
set-up until the populations of the Levant were able to govern themselves. Yet, while the
French might have portrayed their presence in the region as guests with a message for
enlightenment in reality they were conquerors. A French publication in the 1930s saw
that “in the opinion of the majority of the French, France poses Syria. Its duty is to
administer and preserve French interests there. One does not negotiate with the colonies.
One keeps them and protects them against outside threats. One administers them. And
that is all…for the majority of Frenchmen in effect our mandate in Syria is hardly more
than a fiction.”96 Rather than follow the visions of Wilson on self-determination and selfgovernment the mandate system was created as a means to re-create old colonial
aspirations and possessions that were shaped to suit the aspiration of the new era. The
French humiliated the Syrians, and the in reverse, the Syrians mistrusted the French as
they were autocratic and saw the Syrians as inferior to themselves. Their aims to control
the Levant, were based on three strategies, the first was achieved due to the diverse
composition of the Levant. The French “saw the Levant region as a complex, fragile
mosaic of ethno-religious communities locked in conflict”97, they saw the divisions
between the different sects as ground for the support of the occupation and that the only
way to keep the peace between the fragmented society was through an external ruler.
They claimed that they were protectors of the catholic minorities. They also had major
economic plans for the region, as they were investors in the Lebanese silk industry and
they wanted to open up the Syrian market for trade and transform Syrian agricultural into
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a more productive and profitable industry. The third reason the French wanted to occupy
the Levant was of their interests in North Africa that they believed were being
jeopardized by the rise of Arab Nationalism, and British intervention in the region.98
French policies in the mandate were interventionist and their policies of being
protectionists of the Catholic minorities created a division between them and the Arab
Muslims. The French controlled Syria and Lebanon in the 1920s, through a large military
and a complex hierarchy of French administrators. The authority of the state was in the
hands of the high commissioner. 99 Also Direct-rule imposed by the French meant that
while the Syrians held administrative positions there was no real power, since there were
French advisors for every Syrian admin and final decision making was in the hands of the
French. Electoral politics were also slow. Their direct intervention policies and strategies
of divide and rule left behind a fragile and weak political structure that was not able to
withstand pressure and political challenges that left the Syrian state facing losing battels.
Unlike the British, French colonial rule did not create local political leaders or legitimate
rule and so the system finally collapsed after the French withdrew in 1946.100 The effects
of French rule led to more fragmentation of the region and it manipulated the sectarian
differences. The French started to breakdown the Mandate and the first move in 1920 was
the creation of Greater Lebanon with a Christian majority and a large number of Muslim
inhabitants at the expense of Syria. Since that Syria never recognized the partition
between it and Lebanon and for long that partition created tensions between Lebanon and
Syria, pushing the Syrians to later claim control and legitimacy in Lebanon. Aleppo and

98

Cleveland and Bunton, A history of the modern Middle East, 200.
Ibid, 210.
100
Ibid.
99

47

Damascus were divided into two states. The area around Latakaia was declared another
separate state in 1922. Yet in 1924, Aleppo and Damascus were once again incorporated
within the state of Syria.
The effect of French rule in the mandate was catastrophic. Although the French
had help in the formation of an army and allowed minorities to enlist, this new form of
power given to the minorities stirred hatred and unrest. This ultimately changed the Sunni
dominance in Syria which existed before the creation of the mandate. Gaining power
through enlisting in the military, the minorities were finally taking up arms for
independence and the French policies in the region led to more fragmentation. They
paved the way for sectarian violence through the separation of Aleppo and Damascus and
the creation of greater Lebanon where the Maronite remained the largest religious
community there. They even furthered this sectarian tension by creating a distinction
between the Alwaites and the Druze treating them as new states, up until 1942 when
France added them again along with Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama to create what
is known today as the modern state of Syria.101
The French rule led by an ideology of divide and rule and unrest was a result. A
group of nationalists created the people’s party with aims to achieve Syrian Unity and an
independent state. The founders of the party were urban bourgeoisie. They wanted unity,
independence, modernizing reforms, education and industry. The French liked to
emphasize the social and cultural differences among the Syrians. The Syrians began to
fight against the French and the Druze Revolt took place from 1925-1927. The fighting

101

Neep, Occupying Syria, 78.

48

began with a defeat to the French but by the summer of 1927, the French brought the
hostilities to an end. Negotiations for a constitution took place, elections resulted in an
assembly dominated by the nationalists. The assembly proposed Syrian territories
constitute an indivisible political unity which the High Commissioner rejected. The
French and Syrian Nationalist movements continued to clash with the changes finally
taking place with the break of WWII. The revolt of the Druze became a localized
rebellion and a symbol for Arab nationalism, which turned into a nationalist movement.
Yet as a result of the revolt the Druze and the Alawites gained their autonomy and further
distanced themselves from the Sunni Muslims of Syria. By the end of WII, Syria was
compelled to leave Syria and in 1946, Syria gained its independence. More than twenty
years after the creation of the Mandate, the French left Syria a lot different than what it
was with, a group of nationalist elite, minorities and other groups all fighting for power.
The situation in the Middle East gave the conflict a new perspective, with the creation of
the state of Israel, Arab armies rushed to defend Palestine. Although unified the Arab
armies were ill prepared and their defeat sparked resentment and hatred towards the
existing ruling elite in Syria and Egypt. Egyptian Free Officers led by Mohamed Naguib
and Abdul Nasser staged a coup and replaced the King as the new rulers of Egypt.
Following suit, Syrian young officers assumed the role of guardians of Syria and believed
they had the legitimacy and honor of the state. A series of coups took place in Syria after
the French left.
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2.4 THE FORMATION OF THE BA’TH PARTY
Known as the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party or Ba’th Party, the ideology of the
party was dedicated to the renaissance of the Arab world through secularism and
socialism. The founders of the party Michel Aflaq; a Greek Orthodox born in Damasucs
in 1905102, and Salah-al-din-Bitar, also from Damascus103 grew up in a time where the
Ottoman Empire was advocating for an Islamic caliphate but was being bombarded with
ideas of Arab nationalism, and European influence. During their time France was setting
up schools and institutions in Syria and the founders were a result of this environment.
These were the main factors that shaped the party’s doctrine and manifesto. Educated in
Europe, Aflaq and Bitar were inspired by the rising socialist ideology at the time, both
founders believed that the success of the party resided on what is a blend of European
socialism and Arab nationalism. “The Ba’th was that its leaders were part of a highly
educated minority, and on this basis launched their movement, despite their theory’s
emphasis on the masses. We shall see the system directly reflected in Ba’athist ideas of a
‘socialist vanguard’. Their slogan was unity, freedom and socialism. Aflaq saw three
conditions for success of the ideology and the revolutionary ideas through establishing a
secular and industrial nation with the party acting as the moral vanguard of the state. As
young Syrian officers took over control in Syria after the loss of the Arab armies in 1948,
military rule was consolidated in 1951 when the first military general was placed in
power as prime minister. The military general Shisihkali, set in motion a legacy that
shaped the power struggle in Syria to this very day. He began modernizing the military
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and the over-growing obsession to fight Israel allowed for the population to accept this
kind of military rule. As more young people enlisted in the army he began a culture of
obedience and conformity was set in place and standing up to or opposition to the leader
was not allowed. Furthermore, Shishkali’s military rule was opposed to the ideas of the
founders of the Ba’th Party as he placed foreigners in the country under surveillance,
banned the Muslim brotherhood, and tightened religious and educational activities. With
the army meddling into politics and the Ba’th Party joined the ASP and in 1953, they
formed the Ba’th Socialist party. The bad experience of the Ba’th under the authority of
the three military rulers Hinnawi, Al-Za’im and the Al-Shishakli made them wary of
letting military leaders into politics pushed the Ba’th to explore ways to overthrow those
leader.104
In 1958, a delegation from the military travelled to Cairo to negotiate a union with
Nasser to join both armies as a union between both countries. Nasser insisted on an
unconditional and complete union and abolishing all political parties. The Ba’th Party
and Bitar accepted.105 Scholars saw that this step was out of desperation and fear that the
Ba’th cannot control Syria and so they accepted the union. They believed that Nasser
would allow the Ba’th Party to hold political and social positions, even though they
would have disbanded their own party to set up the Branch of the National Union Party
and they would be able to play a major political and ideological role in the Arab world.
On the other hand, Nasser held all power and took all decisions in Cairo and the
Ba’athists only controlled the ministries of economy, agriculture, labor and social affairs.
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With the unification of Egypt in 1958, Nasser was undergoing a set of policies. Although
the agreement was voluntary to create the sense of Arab unity, Syria was naïve to accept
the Egyptian terms. While Egypt always had a strong leader and a unified structure, Syria
didn’t, rather it was a dispersed population. Nasser was strong and charismatic but the
Ba’th party had no outstanding leader and had little mass appeal. And so it was easy for
Nasser to take control of both countries and the Egyptian officers had a great influence on
the local affairs of Syria. Slowly the Ba’th Party were losing power in their own country
and they were unable to achieve their political aspirations. The Ba’th and Nasser relations
got worse even further specially after the 1959 elections Nasser set up to the National
Assembly and planned to make the Ba’th lose them. Then the Ba’th ministers resigned
from the government as a reaction to feeling betrayed by Nasser. Ba’th officers set up a
secret military committee while in Cairo in 1959 awaiting the right moment to change the
situation. Despite that the moment to overthrow Egypt, in 1961the move was not carried
out by the military organization but by the right wing Syrian officers who were repressed
by Nasser. The secession and the failure of the Union led to both the fragmentation of
the Ba’th party and consolidating of its position in the Syrian political scene at the same
time. On February 8th 1963, the Iraqi branch of the Ba’th Party seized power and started
to align with Cairo. Syria felt surrounded by enemies and senior officers planned a coup
with help from the Military committee, which included Hafiz –al Assad so the Ba’th
Party was officially in power.106 The Ba’th Party believed that development can only be
achieved from above by state action, land reform and the creation of rural institutions and
through party mobilization. Once in power a new power struggle began to form and
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several figures within the party carried out coups to hold power. One of the most
prominent events that took place in the 60s was the purge of the Druze along sectarian
lines107 and the rise of the Alwais to power, soon the Alwais were dominating the regime.
This power was consolidated with the rise to power of Hafiz- Al-Asad who insisted on
military build-up and dominance.
Following his rise to power Hafiz Al-Asad had to consolidate his authority in the
country to avoid facing a similar fate as his predecessors. Thus he saw that the way to do
that was to invest in building a strong party and a strong military but both had to be
separated. Obsessed with loyalty,108 he set in motion a political system that would allow
him to maintain total control over all the state institutions including the security apparatus
which were concerned with keeping the regime safe but also not allow for any kind of
defection within the security apparatus itself.109 Elite conflict that had plagued the
political arena in the 1960s between the Ba’th party and the military pushed Hafiz alAsad to create a decentralized political system, one that too was authoritarian but was
quiet different form the system in Egypt. He shaped political life in the country around
himself and created power pillars that he would be able to manipulate into controlling the
state. 110 These were the military, the Ba’th Party and the security apparatus, particularly
the intelligence sector. To avoid fragmentation in society; Asad devised an ideology that
can group society around it, and so he manipulated the Arab identity of the party to
become that of the state to bring together all groups of people. Through shaping a new
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Ba’th Party, Asad was able to attract a wide base of supporters; particularly from the rural
areas, through which the party had immense mobilization power. Further, by making the
party have such a wide base of support he set in motion a party that was parallel to the
government itself.111 In the military and the intelligence agency he positioned loyalists in
the highest positons; where his personal guards were composed of members of his Alawi
kin and senior non-Alawi Ba’athist officers held the other high ranking positions in the
military and acted as a link between the party and the military.112 The Asad regime
cannot be described as minority based or sectarian because he was only able to maintain
peace and stability through creating cross-sectarian institutions; even though he kept
those loyal to him in the highest ranking jobs.113 For all the years he ruled, Asad
maintained a stable ruling system that gave autonomy to the politicized institutions but
his decentralized ruling methods kept the fragmented society together. Fast forward to the
year 2000, his son Bashar took over power after his death and at the first few years of his
presidency the Ba’th Party still maintain power over the government but this its old guard
also seemed to have power over the president. Later, Bashar would alienate the party and
the support base in the countryside by reshaping the structure of the state by placing all
the country’s resources in building modern cities and a liberalized economy.114 Through
his economic projects Bashar would create new clientele amongst the business elite in
Aleppo and Damascus who would later support him once political disruptions take place
in 2011.115 Bashar’s deliberate decisions of giving power to his family and friends and by
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creating whole divisions of Alawis in the military and the elite security services had set
off a Pandora ’s Box of sectarian divisions that were dormant under the rule of his father.
These divisions that were long created during the French mandate in the 1920s, were long
subdued with Asad’s strong personality and his direct control over the party. However,
Bashar would once again manipulate these divisions to mobilize pro-government
supporters in face of the political activists in the cities of Deraa’ and the opposing regions
and with that would through the country into sectarian violence and civil war.116 The next
chapter will analyze the dynamics of society under Bashar and the incentives of violence
in the country’s different regions and those used by the different actors to mobilize
whether with or against the regime, once the Arab Spring movements reached Syria.
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CHAPTER THREE
INCENTIVES OF VIOLENCE
“In Syria, the image of President Hafiz al-Asad is everywhere. In newspapers, the
television, and during orchestrated spectacles Asad is praised as the ‘father’, the ‘gallant
knight’ even the country’s ‘premier pharmacist’.”117
Lisa Wedeen
As protests erupted across Egypt, followed by Libya, Algeria, Yemen, Bahrain
and Syria it seemed that a distant idea of Pan-Arabism, a dream once thought to be
achieved as new national governments took over in the 1950s and 1960, would be finally
achieved. While the protestors aspired to create change calling for political freedom,
social equality and a better living standard, not all of the Arab spring movements
managed to achieve that democratic transition, soon what was being called a revolution
took new names. The movements were no longer considered revolutionaries as they
failed to achieve grass-root change and rather in many instances the old elite was
replaced with a new elite and no real ideological change took place. In some cases, the
uprisings took a more violent turn and were no longer on the path to achieve any form of
democracy, rather the violence left those countries in a state of war. For example, in Syria
what started out as a continuation of peaceful protesting across the region soon escalated
into a civil war and “Syria’s incredibly courageous protestors were met with horrifying
massacres and a paralyzed international community.”118
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To understand the dynamics of the Syrian conflict and analyze why the uprising
became a civil war despite different outcomes in similar events happening in neighboring
countries we must process the different factors and variables that led to this kind of
escalation. Unlike, Egypt for example, Syria has never had a national identity where the
regime can rally the people around. Scholars describe the history of the Syrian state as
one compromised of fragmented sectarian and ethnic identities. Yet, since Hafiz al-Asad
took over power he forged a decentralized regime that was able to maintain its authority
and power over the population and maintain its existence. During Hafiz al- Asad’s reign
he maintained a balance between the different sects by keeping a group of those who
were loyal to him close and in power but at the same time playing them against each
other in order to keep that kind of control. As explained in the previous chapter, when
Hafiz al-Asad took over power in the 1970s he forged a system that relied mainly on
three pillars, deeply politicized but the decentralization of the institutions meant that
sectarian divisions were not aggravated as we would see after Bashar al-Asad takes over
following the death of his father. 119 As the regime realized that it would be faced with
the same fate as the neighboring regimes, it reacted in a repressive and vicious. This
chapter aims at analyzing the dynamics of the regime under Bashar Al-Asad particularly
in the late years leading to the civil war. Further, this chapter will outline the different
factors that led to the mobilization of different regions and groups within the uprising and
how that affected the escalation of violence leading to a civil war.
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3.1 Overview of Bashar’s Regime
When Hafiz al-Asad passed away his son, Bashar, a young cosmopolitan man
who studied for a period of time in the United Kingdom, interested in information
technology and well-spoken seemed to be a fresh start for many who have regarded his
father as harsh. He came with promises of economic liberalization and development
projects as he took office in 2000. “Bashar appealed to the largely Sunni and Christian
urban elite and middle class who saw that he was different to his father who was more
sophisticated and integrated with the elite. They saw him as a reformist because he was
married to the Sunni bourgeoisie and he was educated in the UK and interested in
technology and well-spoken in English.”120 During his inauguration speech he spoke of
democracy and reforms which increased his support base.121 The early years of Bashar’s
regime were dominated with the old guard and the decentralized status of the state
remained intact with the main pillars set up during the time of Hafiz al-Asad; the Party,
the Military and the Security Services remained intact. The ‘elites’ or so called ‘old
guards’ were in control of the presidency when Bashar first took over power, and the first
reverse track the regime took against the reform policies of the new president were to be
found from 2000-2001 during what was known as the Damascus Spring. Intellectuals felt
freer to discuss openly their aspiration for political freedom and economic liberalization.
“Riad Seif, an entrepreneur and outspoken member of parliament, went the furthest,
putting forward social-democratic ideals of a ‘fair market economy’.”122 Capitalizing on
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Bashar’s speech on reforms and actions he took such as the release of political prisoners
and activists led this movement only to discover that the new regime still had red lines
and that their actions were met with severe consequences. Seif made a mistake when he
announced that he wanted to create his own party. As the debates on freedom were
dismissed the regime paved the way for a tragedy when it ignored constructive opposition
and later it would be faced with a new kind of opposition, one that was much more
aggravated and unorganized. What could have become an opportunity for the new
president to create change and change the dynamics of the state was halted by existing
politicized institutions. Although Bashar’s inauguration speech might not have actually
made promises of political freedom per say, it was clear that the image he created for
himself as a reformists resonated with political circles, that for long have been suppressed
and were waiting to engage in public space freely. Therefore, it was not a surprise that
when the activists arrested on behalf of the Damascus Spring events, it was viewed that
Bashar was being apprehended by an old guard that was fighting change to remain in
power. 123
In an attempt to consolidate his power Bashar committed another mistake that
would also offset the balance once created by his father. By 2005, Bashar had been able
to replace many of the heads of the pillars of the state and the security services with loyal
friends and family members. “One of the mistakes that he made was that he began to
dismiss some of his father’s loyalists such as Khaddam the Sunni and vice-president.”124
He also parted with his dads habits of surrounding himself with loyalists; from across the
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different sects, often playing them against each other, while allowing corruption within
manageable limits and divorcing security matters from business interests. Five years
before the crisis unfolded, the Bashar regime became more Alawi compared to the one
that existed under Hafiz al-Asad. Despite the circle of trust was being narrowed greatly
the decentralized character of the regime remained intact. Just as during the Hama
uprising in the 1980s, the decentralization of the state was important to maintain a
balance and Bashar did not try not offset that balance entirely. “The coalition included a
cross sectarian mixture of Alawis, Sunnis, Shia’s and Druze in the Ba’th Party, security
services, military and bureaucracy.”125 It was particularly evident in the second layer of
the regime where he aligned himself with Sunni business elite, especially in the cities of
Aleppo and Damascus, whom remained loyal when the uprising gained momentum and
as violence escalated. On the other hand, marginalizing important members of the regime
from the old guard alienated a lot of the cadres and clients in the rural areas. 126 Two of
his direct family members; his brother became the head of the Republican guard, and his
brother in law rose through military intelligence and assumed senior positions. Across the
country other relatives were in charge in the Ba’th Party, appointed as government,
minsters and ambassadors.127 Once again we find that the Ba’th Party and other
institutions of the state, such as the military and the security services were being used for
patronage purposes however, this time the demographics of those benefiting from being
close to the ruling circle was much more different to that during the reign years of Hafiz
al-Asad.
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When Bashar assumed power the country was being held back with economic and
social problems. While he began programs of economic liberalization, the politicization
of the institutions meant that the programs were held hostage by patrimonial interests and
bureaucratic fighting. “The privatization of state companies faced ideological and
interest-based obstacles, while cutting food and energy subsidies, a major fiscal expense
risked alienating the poorer classes”.128 Bashar focused mainly on the urban cities of the
state particularly Aleppo and Damascus for development of the infrastructure there, all
the money was being poured into those cities, and the spending on health care and
education in the rural regions was diminishing. Such policies created deep distortions in
the countryside, and alienated the regime’s traditional support base creating a huge gap
between the rural and urban classes meant that when uprising was mobilizing, antiregime protests found a willing audience within peasants to mobilize against the regime.
While civil wars do occur in poor countries, it is not the GDP per say that is a direct
factor of civil war onset, rather it is the de-link between the regime and certain regions
that is dangerous; as rebel groups can hid away in such regions and then using coercive
tools or incentives to gain the support of the people.129 Therefore, the cutting back on
money given to clients in the Ba’th Party that were used for supported the rural regions
meant that the people were further away from the regime and its reach.130 “The
government also altered its agricultural policies just as a drought hit the country in 2006,
affecting the livelihood of nearly 1.5 million Syrians and leading to the displacement if a
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similar number.” 131 To help solve and ease the troubles that occurred during the drought
that hit the rural areas, the regime allowed the Islamic charities to step in and fill the void
that the government had left. Come the Arab Spring, the regime would find itself faced
once again with a Sunni front.
Elite security forces and the thugs would also play an important role in the
escalation of violence that would occur during the early days of the uprising before the
country would fall into civil war. Asad relied heavily on the ‘mukhabart’ or the security
services and external threats always gave the regime the green light to keep the regime
safe with no regards to any checks on the authority and the actions of this institution. The
security services were being used as a tool by the regime to offer jobs, benefits and favors
based on loyalty and not on performance. The same thing was happening with demotion
or even discriminatory promotions. One of the counter-revolutionary tactics that the
regime has devised when Bashar came to power was to keep the regime safe was within
the military. Men in Syria had compulsory recruitment in the military and by giving
higher positions in the military and other elite security forces such as the Republic Guard
to the Alawis meant that he can keep a circle of loyalists to his side and ensure his
safety.132 This was also evident in the military hierarchy in particular. “The regime
crafted an informal hierarchy where a non-Sunni subordinate who had better regime
access accompanied a Sunni officer to assert his loyalty.”133 This specific organization in
the military and security services would again create problems come the uprising. The illtreatment of many of the Sunni officers and the organization of such a hierarchy gave
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incentive for many Sunni generals and soldiers to defect when the opportunity presented
itself during the first months of the uprising.
3.2 From Uprising to Civil War and the Role of Ideology:
The Syrian Civil War has been portrayed in many different ways by policy
makers and the media. While many news agencies have rushed to frame the conflict as a
sectarian war there are many identities involved in the conflict and therefore it is
important to discuss them and the role of the different ideologies in the dynamics of the
war and even its duration. The definition of ideology can be used in many ways one of
which “coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs, or values through which people posit,
explain and justify ends and means or organized social action.”134 When protests erupted
on March 15th 2011 in Syria it was not expected that they would occur there in particular,
as the first trends of the protests seemed to be against the western backed regimes and
Syria did not fit that trend. The regime in Syria has for long portrayed itself as a
nationalist, particularly Arab nationalist and patriotic. The Asad regimes both under
Hafiz and Bashar, have been framing their legacy as being anti-Israel and anti-western.135
For long, this has worked for the regime, whereas Hafiz Al-Asad maintained a balance
between different sects and classes and Bashar was expected to follow suit with the Ba’th
party representing the regime’s secular identity. As the world watched Egypt, Tunisia,
Libya and then Bahrain catch on momentum in the Arab Spring protests the Syrian
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regime reaction was to state that Syria is not like Egypt or Tunisia. Rather, the regime
was quick to state that there have been failures in the past years that will be fixed and
policies reformed as a precautionary step to any motives for protests to occur. It was also
though unlikely that Syria would protest against the Asad regime as there was no
established opposition or political parties or a civil society that might mobilize and
organize such demonstrations against the regime like in Egypt and Tunisia.136 However,
soon the momentum caught on and the first signs of opposition began to take form in the
rural region of Syria. Initially the protests will small acts of demonstration with a few
group of people gathering around government buildings. The marches were not even
directed at Bashar rather slogans showed that the people saw him as a savior, the slogan
“Bashar save us from the gang”137 implied that it was the police and corrupt officials who
were targeted by the march. Small marches were called for to protest corruption in
Damascus and Aleppo but they did not gain momentum. “A group called the Movement
of Democratic Youth organized a march in the city of Al-Raqqah in the northern east side
of Syria to protest the killing of two members of a Kurd organization by security forces.
Another man in the city of al-Hasakah set himself on fire following the example of
Bouazizi in Tunisia.”138 The regime too was watching the events in neighboring
countries, and the events that broke out the days following the initial calls for protesting
in Syria looked like Asad was not prepared to risk losing any ground. Thus the regime
was entirely prepared to react as repressively as it took to end the movement in its tracks
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before other events unfolded. The initial wave of protests that was on a small scale where
groups of women would protest in front of the ministry of interior, escalated when
disorder erupted in the city of Deraa’ in the third week of March. It was clear that the first
waves of the rebellion in Syria was being organized by secular movements calling for
freedom and democracy. “The largely peaceful opposition that emerged in March 2011
was decentralized and local, but with national goals. They spoke for ‘the people’ and
‘Syria’ rather than any ethno-sectarian group, even if most were Sunni Arabs. The regime
responded by also emphasizing its nationalist credentials and both sides deployed
inclusive slogans and symbols, including rival Syrian flags.”139 Inspired by the slogans of
the Egyptian revolution, a group of boys between the ages of 10-15 scribbled anti-regime
graffiti on the walls. At the suburbs of the city a military base was stationed that housed
Alawi officers and their families.140 After the boys were found spraying the graffiti they
were picked up and held hostage for days. Officers from the military base told their
parents that they should forget about their children and try to have new ones.141 When the
boys returned it was evident that they tortured. The incident hit a cord with the resident of
the city, the fact that the officers were Alawi and tortured 10 and 15-year-old boys for
graffiti was an insult to the people. The detention of the small children and the torture
that they experienced enticed demonstrations in the center of the city and as a result
during the march, the Ba’th party headquarter was set on fire.142 Members of the armed
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forces reacted with violence and shot on the protestors which in return pushed more
people in neighboring towns to go to the streets to protest this act of violence and in
return police fired on them with small arms. This cycle of violence was to become a
pattern across the country whenever a protest would erupt further creating tension. “The
Syrian regime created its own catastrophe by unleashing unnecessary violence and
bungling offers of reform, and soon found itself caught in vicious cycle of selfperpetuating escalation.”143 Anger and fear felt by the protestors led to the them letting go
of ideas of the peaceful protesting and so they too resorted to violence which essentially
led to the increase of violence and mobilization. The first reaction of the regime was to
claim that the soldiers who fired on the protestors acted without the consent of their
commanders and a representative of the ministry of interior visited the town to offer his
condolences. The Prime Minister soon acknowledged that these areas had faced unfair
treatment and promised changes and reform to happen. In an attempt to deflate the
tension building up in the region, the government promised several reforms that have
long been called for by some activities over the past ten years. They promised an increase
in workers’ salaries and the review of the emergency act that had been implemented back
in the 1963.144 However, these concessions did not work, and soon the city was in
demonstration again, this time point-blank against the regime. As the clashes began, state
television often broadcasted that armed gangs were responsible for the attacks, or
Palestinian refugees, and later they broadcasted that it was members of the Muslim
brotherhood who were responsible for the attacks. 145 In contrast Deraa’ was surrounded
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by the military and it was being punished for crossing the red tapes. For four weeks there
was no water, food or electricity and the protestors were often shot upon although they
were peaceful. Snipers began targeting young people in the street. The mosques were also
attacked by security officers who wrote on the walls “Your God is Bashar”, “There is no
God but Bashar” and in the first ten days of attacks, some 200 people were killed.146
Security forces were also visiting hospitals to arrest anyone who was had an injury that
was related to being part of a protest. As a result of the violence and the number of death
in Deraa, the protests were spreading to other rural towns and soon they would hit major
cities such as Homs and Hama. In the aftermath of the attack on Deraa’ to members of
the People’s Assembly resigned.147
Soon, disorder spread to the cities of Latakia, protestors were setting fire to Ba’th
party headquarters at the same time the regime was claiming that police agents were
being attacked by Sunni elements. On March 30, 2011, the president spoke to the people
blaming the unfortunate events that took place on conspirators both foreign and domestic,
and promised that reforms will be made but they needed time to be achieved and that
things should not be rushed.148 His speech reflected that he was isolated from the events
that had already taken place claiming that it was a conspiracy against Syria and its
aspirations to become the hub of the region. He tried to dismiss the idea that anything
happening in Egypt for example would not be happening in Syria because Syria was not
Egypt for example, implying that his regime was much more intact and stable than the
ones on neighboring countries that were already removed from power. However, the
146
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reforms and changes that were proposed were not enough to silence or deescalate the
situation and civil rights activists organized to occupy the clock tower square in Homs
until the state of emergency was disbanded and all political prisoners were freed. Security
forces stayed away from the protestors and occasionally used pepper spray and shot fires
in the air. However, on the second day of protesting police forces and armed thugs moved
in the square and shot at the demonstrators. Yet again a tactic that the regime seems to be
often using, state television broadcasted that it was Islamist militia who attacked the
protestors and at that point military units were deployed throughout the northeastern
suburbs of the capital to secure the safety of the citizens. They then conducted house-tohouse sweeps throughout the residential neighborhoods and arrested suspected
activists.149 Social media played a huge role in the spread of news of government
atrocities that took place inside Deraa’ and soon the protests spread across to other
regions. With this mobilization against the regime spreading, Bashar realizes that this
cannot be easily stopped through mere concessions. Rather, the regime started to change
its strategy which was a pitfall into more violence. As protestors took to the streets of
Hama, Homs and Dair-al Zur the authorities relied on snipers and shabbiba; thugs who
worked with security forces to instill fear in order to crush the rebellion. Authorities also
began to mobilize cadres of party members, including students loyal to the regime and
workers through grouping them into small militias, armed, to maintain order and counter
the mobilization of the opposition.150 Homs and Hama were the first urban cities to revolt
and the battle to demobilize the opposition there was deadly. “As clashes broke out in
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Homs between the armed protestors and the security forces, armed forces up-scaled the
attack on Bab ‘Amru using mortars, heavy machine gun fire and tanks.”151 As with
Hama, tens of thousands of protestors went to the city square to protest the torture and
death of a 13-year old boy from Deraa’, during the march the security forces shot on the
crowd and news reported that that around 200 people were killed during that march. A
week later, snipers shot in the same city on a funeral passing resulting in more deaths.152
As a result, protestors torched down the state buildings and took over the police station
killing eight security forces and stole weaponry.153 As the protests spread to Idlib, Latakia
and other cities, by late May Human Rights Watch estimated that some 887 people were
killed, 418 were from Dera’ alone. As the uprising gained momentum, and with more
civilians dying there was transformation in the conflict as defections in many regions
from the army started to take place. “The first sign of defection from the army was under
Colonel Husain Harmush who formed an anti-regime military formation named the Free
Officer’s Movement.”154 The defection of soldiers from the Syrian Army meant that the
opposition had access to weapons they can take up against Bashar’s loyalist forces. “In
the town of Al Bu Kamal in the eastern side, activists helped by security guards who
joined them attacked the district admin building and stole heavy weaponry. Further,
Colonel Riyad Asa’d defected along with six soldiers and started a military formation
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known as the Free Syrian Army. They were joined later by Major Abd al-Rahman Shaikh
Ali and Captain Qais Qatanah from Dira’.”155
With the formation of the FSA, the identity of the rebellion took a different shape.
The secular ideology that started the movement was being replaced by a more Islamist
identity that was being led by the SNC. The Muslim Brotherhood in the diaspora, mainly
in Tukey and Saudi Arabia was leading the new formation of the armed brigades, yet
despite that there was still some form of diversity within the opposition movement.
“The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood supported a leadership of the SNC that was different
from its ideological background and even distanced itself from the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood.”156 However, this did not last and once again as the violence protracted, the
identity of the conflict changed once new factions of opposition were formed upon new
ideologies. As divisions within the SNC took place, this was reflected on the ability of
the FSA to fight back against the violence mobilized by the regime.
This major turn in the dynamics of the uprising was bringing it closer to reach a
civil war as more people were having access to weaponry, after many police stations and
security buildings were raided or torched to the ground.157 Clearly, the opposition and
the regime were using different tactics of mobilization; whether it was to gain or maintain
loyalty to topple the other side. As the uprising reached its sixth month several battles
were taking place between the regime along with its security forces and the shabbiha in
regions all the way from Deraa’ to Latakia and Homs. “By the 6th month of the rebellion
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the UN estimated that the death toll had reached 2,600.”158 By Mid-August 2011, there
was a coordinated land and sea attack on Latakia, particularly targeting the Sunni
neighborhoods, “shabihha and armed forces attacked protestors who continued to
mobilize to mourn those who were previously killed by security forces.”159 Protestors
were calling for the cities of Damascus and Aleppo to join in the uprising, which up until
the first few months of the uprising, activities there had failed to mobilize due to a large
portion of the business elite in the city being supporters of Bashar, whom were skeptical
of the motivations and ideology of the rural protestors. Despite that lack of momentum,
the force of violence that had spread through the other regions had brought the country
into a full on civil war with both sides fighting for survival. In many instances while
some people might not want to be part of the violence, anger at the destruction or torture
they might experience, or by their loved ones, would push them to resort to violence as
well. Therefore, it was clear that when the Deraa boys were tortured, the conflict was
bound to escalate and reach a civil war, particularly in a state like Syria. Although the
uprising did not start because of sectarian grievances, it quickly became focused on that
aspect of Syrian society where the rebels and the regime both capitalized on past
sectarian regimes to mobilize. 160
Reviving this sectarian division, the Syrian regime resorted to recruiting Shia
fighters whom were trained by Hezbollah and Iran. Further, fighters from both countries
volunteered to travel to Syria in order to come to the aid of the regime and maintain its
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fighting grounds.161 As a result of Sunni death toll rose and it was clear that that the
conflict was taking a different rhetoric; particularly as a result when Sunni-jihadist
organization infiltrated the lines of the opposition. At this turning point in the conflict,
Sunni-jihadist rhetoric was appealing as the conflict took a religious and ideological
dynamic; being a war between Shia and Sunni forces. Many young men found JabhatAl-Nusra and ISIS; despite being inherently different, both believed in jihad, as a
salvation to fight the regime using Iranian soldiers to kill its people. At this point, the
regime’s repression along with the lack of coordination and weakness of the secular
opposition pushed many liberals to flee or to resort to extremism in order to survive.162
Ultimately changing the trajectory of the rebellion. The remaining part of this chapter
gives a more detailed analysis of the different factors at play with the mobilization of the
different communities and the incentives of violence at play by explaining the difference
between Top-Down and Bottom-Up violence and analyze the motivations and conditions
that make such a mobilization of violence possible.
3.3 Mobilization and Violence:
Mobilization and violence during the rebellion in Syria help us understand the
dynamics of the civil war once it broke out and its duration. Mobilization that took place
during the first weeks of the rebellion can be traced to past political and economic
grievances years before the conflict erupted. Methods and incentives for mobilization and
violence occurred differently in various regions across the country. According to
Balanche, in order to understand the civil war we must examine the political geography
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of the Syrian Uprising. “When Hafiz al-Asad came to power the country was 6 million
people made of largely rural society and by the time of the uprising the population was
more urbanized and expanded to 22 million people. The population was 50% under the
age of 19 and 57% of those under 25 were unemployed.”163 Over the years the regime
spread in the countryside and driven by the ambitions and resentments of marginal men,
the new Asad regime would meet its nemesis nearly half a century later in the same
countryside. The uprising erupted in the city of Deraa, an administrative center of the
agricultural plain of Hawran. This was the town where a group of 10 to 15-year-old boys
were tortured. There in the city was the first sign of danger as the torturing of the young
boys presented a pattern that had been going on there for years as the regime had
constantly alienated itself form the agricultural regions. “The gap between city and
country widened as the regime grew disintegrated in the rural provinces. The presence of
the state in the life of the neglected provinces reduced to the predatory presence and
practices of the security services”.164 The tribal identity of the city was not easy to be
contained especially when the people there regarded the governor and security chiefs as
outsiders who disrespected the people of Deraa and tortured its children.165 Mobilization
in Deraa represented a pattern that would be evident in other cities in the countryside,
mobilization that was motivated initially by networks of alienation from the regime in
addition to repression that was evidently present and manifested in the torturing of the
children. In similar neighborhoods, ‘Houran’ like other regions across Syria was also
benefitting from the agricultural policies of the 1980s, and was full of resources. As the
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new government had different priorities for investment, public investment and
infrastructure were cut from rural areas. Public spending on education and health care no
longer were enough for the people and the situation was made worse by the drought of
2006. Villagers were relocated and lived in poor alleyways in Aleppo and Damascus.
This mix of factors was present in Idlib, once a source of army recruits and party
members, poverty and unemployment there led to massive discontent.166 It was clear that
economic grievances that the residents of the countryside had endured due to failed
agricultural and urbanization projects were enough to attract supporters to the growing
movement of rebellion. Mobilization continued, spreading onwards to the cities of Hama
and Homs, were the first urban cities to join the rebellion. Hama is a homogenous Sunni
city that was troubled with previous memories of the1980 rebellion led by the Muslim
Brotherhood that the Asad regime had repressively put down claiming some 20,000
lives.167 Homs is a cosmopolitan city where Christian, Shia, Alawite, Sunni, Christian
and Ismailis. The city was very attractive for investment but it seemed that the investment
and the benefits of the high growth were unevenly distributed. The Alawite quarters of
Homs, were perceived as being favored in terms of infrastructure. Therefore,
mobilization was predominantly Sunni, with some Christian and Ismaili dissidents. Yet
the Alawis remained loyal.168 While the first months of the rebellion were not motivated
by sectarian lines, yet the progress of mobilization in Sunni majority areas took shape due
to unequal distribution of wealth.
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Mobilization amongst anti-regime supporters was met with mobilization amongst
the support base of the Asad regime mainly in the urban cities of Aleppo and Damascus.
Damascus was affected by the uprising differently, the polarization over the revolution
was manifested in the city of Damascus. There the mobilization was to be found in Sunni
majority regions in the city that were once rural but became urban in the wave of
modernization of the city. These elite circles were mobilized by the regime as they have
for long benefited from the many liberalization projects there.169 Further, there was cross
sectarian alliances between the Alawi security officers and the Sunni business class
merchants of the city. Mobilization amongst the business elite of Damascus was
motivated by economic cooperation between the regime. These networks of patronage
would ensure that these business elite would remain loyal to the regime as the conflict
unfolds. On the other hand, there were districts of Damascus that were infested with
poverty and unemployment these cities were home to middle class, rural migrants,
conservatives and poor Sunnis all joined the rebellion early on as the had not benefited
from the regime and were left out of the regime’s circle.170 Aleppo also joined the
rebellion later, the cosmopolitan city relied mainly on tourism for its booming economy
and the obvious urban-rural divide that existed halted its participation, as the urban
populating was suspicious of the motives of a rural led rebellion and there were also a
majority of Kurds and Christian communities that took the side lines. However, since the
beginning of the uprising, college students at the University of Aleppo staged several
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protests which were often met with violence at the hands of other pro-regime students or
even thugs who entered the dormitory beating and shooting at students.171
The Alawi community is probably one of the pillars of the regime’s resilience
since the protests occurred and plays a major role in the dynamics of violence of the civil
war. Alawite regions were not debating whether to join the uprising or not since the
community improved during Bashar’s reign more even than during his father’s and with
that it created loyalty to the regime. They were also easily mobilized by the regime due to
the patrimonial ties with the ruling family. “Elite mobilization is based on kin and family
ties to keep interests. In other words, patronage.”172 It is also evident that the presence of
the Alawis in cities whether in mixed communities or in ones where the different
communities were separated along sectarian lines there was more occurrence of violence.
Balanche finds in his analysis of the geo-political map of Syria, that the nearness of
Alawi land was a factor in the intensity of the protests. “The coastal cities of Latakia,
Baniyas, Jableh and Tartus had Alawi majorities. Tell Khalakh on the western edge of
Homs ad a Sunni majority but the villages around it were Alawis lands. The communal
fault lines between the Sunnis and the Alawis became lines of trouble and strife.”173
It is interesting to analyze why the Kurds choose that stance. It is evident that
they were undecided, although protests had broken out in the Kurdish community when
the regime offered them citizenship; chanting that they did not want the citizenship, that
it had been already too late for that. Yet, they decided that if the state was to fall into a

171

Hokayem, Syria's uprising.
Wood, “The Social Process of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social
networks”.
173
Fabrice Balance. "Géographie de la Révolte Syrienne." Outre-Terre, (2011), 437-58.
172

76

civil war, it would be best to stay away from the rebellion, to be able to establish a defacto groups to gain autonomy.174 The regime also withdrew from the Kurdish region
counting on an escalation that would some from the tension between the Kurds and the
opposite groups as the Kurds did distrust of the Sunnis. Other minorities such as the
Druze remained on the sideline, while the Shia were supporting to the Asad regime
because of the linkage between the regime and Iran and Hezbollah. The decision of the
Syrian Christians made up by the events that took place around, they saw that an Islamist
government would reverse the freedoms they had gained under Asad and so they
remained loyal to him.
As the rebellion took a more violent dynamic the regime had used many tactics
that encouraged the spread of violence. During the first episodes of violence that took
place while demonstrators arranged protests, was top-down violence. “Top-Down”
violence refers to “violence that is mobilized by the political leaders and entrepreneurs
whether for political or economic reasons. This existence of powerful groups mobilizing
violence creates large-scale violence when coercion is used to get recruits.”175 While
Top- Down violence results in short-term profits, this form of violence is not always
motivated due to economic factors, rather some are political.176 Violence in the Syrian
case, during the first stages of the conflict was tolerated in pro-regime circles and clearly
motivated by the patrimonial nature of the regime which was exclusive in nature to the
Alawi community as shown in the examples above. The first forms of top-down violence
as previously illustrated reflected the immense threat the regime felt and was essentially
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the driving factor for Bottom-Up violence that was carried out by protestors. This kind
response by the regime to the demonstrations showed that it had put security over
compromise, and a desire to alter the nature of the uprising to provoke an armed conflict
that could then be met with forced apparatus was one of its goals, believing that it can
then kill the rebellion. Being aware of what has already happened in neighboring
countries the Syrian regime was “prepared to stop the uprising in its tracks and not risk its
escalation and so the regime initially the regime used traditional security operations in the
cities where demonstration broke by arresting activities, intimidation, torture and also
quietly reach local chiefs.”177As for the rural areas, which posed a bigger challenge the
regime deployed military assets. While the uprising was gaining momentum and the
methods of torture strategy was counter-productive and the spark of the rebellion and
violence caught; particularly with the defection of soldiers and the easy access to
weaponry, the regime once again changed its tactics and decided to play on mistakes of
the rebellion in terms of abuse and thus with it stirred more violence this time along
sectarian lines, which frankly deemed catastrophic.178 The regime used state media to
spread news of attacks by Islamist organization to instill fear into the Alawi community
and other minorities aiming to showcase that their survival was dependent on the survival
of the regime. That way the regime was able to mobilize these communities when
needed. One example of such an incident that the regime used to its benefit was the attack
on the resident town of Mezze 86, that housed Alawi officers. This attack was key to
mobilize pro-regime demonstrations across social and economic classes. As a result, also,
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many Alawi militias were formed and give the authority by the regime to patrol areas that
has anti-regime protests which eventually gave way to more violence. Often though the
regime was also use the same narrative to cover-up atrocities that it actually
committed.179 Another example of an incident where the regime used sectarian division
to entice fear and eliminate the opposition was in the city of Baniyas where the
population was 65% Alawi. “Sunnis who were deeply offended after the ministry of
education suspended 1,500 teachers who wore the hijab. In the city there existed an oil
refinery where the Alawis had total control of the jobs and monopolized the profit form
the refinery and they hired other Alawis from as far away as Homs. And that was one of
the reasons why the population was prepared to rebel against the regime.”180 Using this
environment as an incentive, security forces attacked the city, and snipers shot at Alawi
and Sunni communities alike. The media portrayed that Islamists were responsible for the
attack and the Alawis living there fled to safer regions. “Baniyas foretold the course of
the rebellion: the neighborhoods divided along confessional lines, the Alawis who ran the
city deserted it for the safety of the mountain, the forces of order fomented trouble
between the sects.”181 As the armed resistance increased the regime went through
different stages and escalated the power that it used to repress the uprising and that added
to the violence and quickly escalated the violence. “During the spring of 2011, the regime
was using the infantry along with shabihha and security services such as snipers, later in
the autumn the regime deployed artillery and by spring 2012 they were using the air force
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by the end of that years the regime was using missiles.” 182 One manifestation of the
escalated usage of military was the missile attack on Latakia from the sea.
Following the trajectory of the Syrian Uprising and the nature of the regime we
come to the conclusion that a major factor in the escalation of top-down violence to a
different outcome to the Arab Spring in Syria; unlike that of Egypt and Tunisia. As the
Syrian modern-nation state was created it has witnessed a lot of instability that took place
right after the French mandate was abolished. As the new nation witnessed many military
coups, by the 1970s a regime was consolidated in power, whose legacy continues today.
While the nation never boasted a national identity to unify its institutions and population
in times of crisis, as Hafiz-al Asad took over power he had to forge an alliance between
the different sects to maintain the stability and continuation of his rule. His success rested
on patronage patrimony where the Alawi sect was making progress and rising in power,
but an alliance was also forged with the Sunni majority particularly those in the rural
areas. During the ten years of his son’s rule, Bashar, was changing the rules of the game.
Considered at the time of succession a reformist, he boasted of more economic
liberalization and a powerful economy. Yet along the way he managed to alienate large
sects of the population, particularly those that have remained the fan- base of the Ba’th
Party. Capitalizing on pre-existing grievances activists in the country-side managed to
entice a dormant group of people, and got them inspired to oppose the corruption and
brutality of the security forces that have been going on long since. As the regime reacted
with violence and repression, a larger base of protesters mobilized. Groups of civilians
long alienated by the regime and oppressed by its repressive tactics once the
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demonstrations started was reflected in episodes of Bottom-Up violence as shown across
Idlib, Latakia, Homs and Hama and in later stages across the country. In order to
maintain its survival, the regime framed many its own acts of violence and others
committed by the opposition as a sectarian violence. Therefore, the regime opened up
Pandora’s box essentially, and mobilizing enough violence that has thrown the country
into a civil war.
3.4 From Bottom-up to Top-Down Mobilization
As the civil war escalated with the opposition splitting into several groups each
with its own agenda the civil war entered another stage of violence. With a fragmentation
of the opposition, many were infiltrated with terrorist organization. The rise of
organizations like ISIS and Jabhat –Al Nusra that filled a void left by more secular rebel
groups, that were unable to maintain financial support as the duration of the war
extended, adds more to the dynamic of violence in the Syrian civil war in particular. Here
we find, that while the mobilization of violence of such rebel organizations is essentially
bottom-up, yet in fact these organizations particularly ISIS can be categorized as topdown mobilization of violence. ISIS recruits are mobilized and employ acts of violence
on civilians and on the regime itself. Acting in the same dynamic of a state, ISIS creates
space for its recruits and loyalists to function as subjects under a hierarchy and therefore
it is able to mobilize violence to achieve an ultimate takeover of power. Further, it
employs violence to protect its economic and political assets; hiding its violation of
human rights under ideology and sectarianism.183 Given the weak state of the country,
and the presence of a fertile ground for such ideological extremism and greed,
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mobilization of violence takes this top-down form.. “Ideology plays a role in the direction
of violence that can be used or held back depending on structural organization and
ideology of the rebel group.”184 In addition, through making profit from greed
opportunities ISIS was able to expand within Syria and utilize its ideology in spreading
its own version of an Islamic state by directing violence towards groups and individuals
the organization views as threat to its expansion. The final chapter of the thesis analysis
the factors that play a role in the protraction of violence and increase the duration of the
civil war in Syria by analyzing the opportunities of greed for both the regime and the
rebels. Further, this thesis will analyze the effect of the fragmentation of the opposition
and rise of terrorism on the protraction of violence as well as the effect of foreign
intervention.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE DYNAMICS AND DURATION OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
“Those who 'abjure' violence can do so only because others are committing violence on
their behalf.”

George Orwell

During the initial calls for protesting there had been no slogans against Bashar or
the Ba’th Party. Protestors were merely calling for economic reforms to ease crushing
hardships they had been facing.185 Later activists would form three coalitions; calling for
negotiating with the regime, they were the “Syrian Revolution General Commission
(SRGC), the Ghad (tomorrow) alliance and the Higher Council of the Syrian
Revolution”.186 Following the first protests which were mostly peaceful, the dynamics of
the uprising began to change as concessions offered by the regime to appease the
protestors did not work. The regime has assumed that the ongoing wave of protesting
would eventually subside just as with the movements in Egypt and Tunisia187. “Without
the military mobilization and violent escalation all parties can reliably expect that that
this wave of mobilization and coordination would be temporary.”188 By offering some
kind of reforms; such as giving Kurds citizenship and reviewing the emergency law in
place since the sixties, they can override the protests. The opposition knew that the
concessions were not serious and that the regime can easily go back on its promises once
the mobilization has phased out and so new protests came out in different regions
claiming that they don’t agree to the reforms proposed and suggested much extremer
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political changes and reforms. While the protestors refused the offers made by the
regime, the regime was concerned with one point and that was not to look weak in the
face of the opposition. According to the ICG Report on the uprising, the regime was
worried that by offering too much concessions and not acting tough it was risking the
creation of more mobilization and maybe regime defections.189 Thus, it was a duty for the
regime to act repressively in order to save its image and to continue to instill the politics
of fear into its citizens.
4.1 Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War
Boasting a military force of about 220,000 men in the army and 70,000 men in the
air force and air defense, the Syrian regime had one of the strongest militaries in the
Middle East.190 With such a military capacity and years of training in war combat, the
regime’s counter-revolution tactics involved using soldiers and military tactics in the face
of the opposition. Once the Syrian Regime openly used violence to repress the peaceful
protests it was clear that both sides would not be able to solve their disputes without
resorting to violence. Scholars find that a key factor of falling into civil war is the
regime’s inability to decide if the opposing force has the ability to militarize or not and
thus this gives more chance for the regime to use force in order to test out the resilience
of the opposition.191 Therefore, following this track of argument we find that extreme
factions of the opposition found a window to militarize in order to face off the regime’s
use of military apparatus and at the same time to maintain the power of mobilization that
had taken place in the days after the Deraa’ torture incident. Shifting from the coalition
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groups founded through peaceful activists, we see more radical formations of the
opposition in Syria.192
As the Asad regime resorted to using snipers to attack protests and then deployed
the elite security forces such as the Republic Guard;193 mainly composed of Alawi
soldiers and shabiiha to attack protests across the country, we find many Sunni officers
and soldiers defecting from the army. The defecting soldiers formed brigades of fighters
and were mainly supplied with light weaponry that they managed to loot.194 The armydefecting brigades that were formed were all grouped under the umbrella of a command
named the “Free Syrian Army”.195 The FSA was created with the assistance of the Syrian
National Coalition (SNC) which consisted of the first activists that initiated the protests
and opposition groups that lived outside of Syria but were supporting the opposition;
made from Sunnis, particularly Muslim Brotherhood, Kurds, and members of other
minorities, whom were calling for the removal of the Asad Regime.196 The SNC held its
very first meeting in Turkey and was supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.197 This type
of foreign support would give a whole new dimension to the Syrian conflict, particularly
in terms of funding to the FSA. Six months into the uprising, the Asad regime had used
artillery on the cities of Idlib and Latakia.198 Many of the residents of those areas joined
the brigades under the FSA. “The Syrian government use of violence as a deliberate
tactic by aerial bombings in areas like Deir al-Zour where the city was mainly under rebel
192
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control pushed the opposition to support the insurgency.”199 The number of its fighter has
been estimated at around 50,000 fighters.200 By November 2011, peaceful protesting had
completely disappeared, the FSA resorted to using guerilla warfare, and suicide bombing
tactics to weaken the Asad forces. As the fighting continued, leadership problems began
to emerge amongst the rebels and many brigades no longer accepted the control of the
FSA or the SNC. Some of the brigades challenged the authority of the FSA and its
ideology, and internal conflicts within the SNC damaged the unity of the rebels. In the
meantime, the Syrian regime had launched a deadly attack on the city of Bab Amru
which it retook under its control in only 36 hours. As FSA forces withdrew, the regime
also shelled the cities of al-Rastan and Idlib.201 A lot of the brigades fled and joined other
forces. The fragmentation of the rebellion due to ideology and operation differences
weakened them and soon there would be up to 1,000 rebel groups operating in Syria, a
factor that would push the conflict more towards a civil war.202 The fragmented rebel
groups began to shape under an Islamist umbrella in 2012, the Syrian Islamic Liberation
Front; a moderate Islamist coalition and included strong brigades like the Farouq and
Tawheed that operated in Homs and Idlib and long the Turkish border.203 Other Salafioriented forces began to appear around the same time operating in other regions. Rebels
that had formed around an Islamist identity were receiving a flow of weaponry from
conservative governments such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, “they were also receiving
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funding from the Syrian diaspora base in the Gulf and western countries.”204 On the other
hand, more moderate rebel groups were supported by the US government. According to
Schulhofer-Wohl “modest external military support to the Syrian opposition ... has in fact
exacerbated the dangers of fratricidal infighting and the rise of extremist groups.”205 The
regime was supported by other foreign powers like Iran and Hezbollah who had provided
the regime with Shia’ fighters from Lebanon and Iraq and trained another militia group;
the Jaysh –al-Shayby (the People’s Army).206As the uprising reaches its second year
since the first protests had taken place in March, the dynamics of the conflict were very
different, as violence has spread to every corner of the country and heavy-weaponry, and
air strikes were being used by the regime against rebel-held grounds increasing therefore
the death toll. By April 2012, the FSA and the regime regular army came into direct
contact along the Jordanian border after the collapse of the first ceasefire proposed by the
UN peace convoy Kofi Anan.207 Battles extended on to include Damascus and Aleppo,
where both sides were retaliating against each other.208 According to Doyle and Sambanis
“armed conflict with at least more than 1,000 related deaths on both fronts during battles
each yeast that challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; occurs
between the boundaries of the state, with the state involved as one of the combatants and
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rebels were able to amount significant casualties to the state.”209 With Asad’s address to
the nation promising to retaliate against the extremists, shabihha killed 70 farmers in the
village of Mazrah al-Quabir in Hama and the armed forces attacked Deraa’ and once
again the rebels retaliated through bombing Aleppo. With the battles moving into the two
major cities of Aleppo and Damascus the UN had declared that Syria was in a complete
state of civil war since the conflict has long before crossed the threshold of a 1000 deaths.
The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to another dimension of the Syrian Civil war in
terms of its duration and the opportunities of ‘greed’ emerged as the conflict protracted.
The analysis traces the different kinds of the economic benefits that were used by the
rebels and the regime to continue fighting the war and maintain its duration.

Figure 4. Diagram showing number of Deaths per week during the Syrian
civil war.210
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4.2 Greed and Duration of the Syrian Civil War
The average duration of civil war according to Collier is an average of seven
years.211 As civil wars prolong a set of factors begin to shape the dynamics of the conflict
in ways that make it even harder to end. According to the literature on the study of
duration of civil war, civil wars might last for a whole decade, others end after a thirdparty intervention and then conflict strikes again, while some have no sight to an end
despite many cease-fires that were not honored.212 Prolonged conflicts create a war
economy that keeps the conflict going where through this war economy rebel groups and
regime forces alike capitalize on making benefits from illicit activities that would have
not been possible if the political and economic system of the country had not broken
down due to the violence. According to David Keen “members of armed gangs can
benefit from looting; and regimes can use violence to deflect opposition, reward
supporters or maintain their access to resources. Under these circumstances, ending civil
wars become difficult and winning them may not be desirable.”213 These war economies
create networks of ‘greed’ that provide incentives for fighting sides to prolong the
duration of war. “In short, greed simply means the ‘economic opportunity to fight and
should be distinguished from socio-political grievances.”214 It is measured in terms of the
availability to resources that can be used to satisfy or benefit fighting groups whether to
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finance their war efforts, recruit fighters or loyalists or to make geographical control.215
Therefore, the Syrian regime and the opposition both become beneficiaries of a
prolonged war, where Greed plays a direct role in the mobilization and spread of violence
to achieve these benefits. In addition, to the obvious beneficiaries of the prolonged
violence, the existing war economy has led to the rise of a new elite group whose wealth
directly relies on the continuation of violence as their status and wealth is made possible
through the illicit trade that otherwise would have not been possible once the war ends.
These new members of the elite are responsible for “the flow of goods between different
parts in Syria and transactions between the regime held areas and the outside world.”216
Hence, due to increased duration of fighting; economic benefits of fighting create further
opportunities of greed and therefore, there doesn’t seem to be an end to this ongoing
cycle of violence that both warring sides find lucrative to continue. “The point of war
might be precisely the legitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime would be
punishable as crimes.”217 Economic functions of violence such as labor exploitation is
often employed by rebels or pro-government forces is evident when there is lucrative
benefits from looting or smuggling natural resources for profit. In this case civilians are
exploited for labor in exchange for protection.218 Other factors of greed would be
extortion through getting protection money from individuals and companies alike and
stealing aid money which then can be politicized to maintain loyalty between rebel ranks
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of regime-supporting forces whose resources would be diminishing as the war continues.
Greed is not only manifested in the economic benefits reaped by the economies of war
created but within the Syrian case it also plays a role in the fragmentation of the rebellion
and the proxy-war fought by the international community. These examples will be further
analyzed in the following section. Greed is referenced in this analysis in terms of any
opportunity presented to prolong the violence and thus increase the duration of the war.
These opportunities can be motivated by economic agendas to make profits otherwise
would not be possible without the usage of violence or could be opportunities where the
violence is a cover-up for the Greed to maintain power as the one being carried out by the
Asad regime. On the one hand, research has shown that terrorist organizations such as
ISIS have managed to operate as semi-states by creating safety-havens for those who
would reside in towns controlled by the organization and providing them with services in
return for their loyalty and support 219and therefore further increasing the capacity of ISIS
to initiate violence to gain territory and expand its power and influence. On the other
hand, the regime has been cutting deals with ISIS, buying oil from the territories under its
control and thus essentially empowering the organization.220
4.3 Opportunities for ‘Greed’ and Economic Functions of Violence
While the Syrian civil war was motivated by past grievances and state dynamics
built on sectarian divisions that led to the usage of violence and the outbreak of civil war,
the duration of the war and the prolonging of violence is directly affected by Greed.
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Unlike other case-studies where Greed was a motivation for the outbreak of civil war, the
role of Greed in the Syrian civil war can be traced to a later stage of the conflict. It is
even often described by news outlets as the ‘second civil war’ particularly with the
emergence of ISIS that essentially changed the flow and dynamics of the conflict. This is
particularly important in understanding the role of Greed at this later stage and its effect
on chances of ending the war. As violence escalated and spread across the country and
with the usage of heavy artillery, new players came into the picture. By April 2013, the
civil war saw the infiltration of many jihadists from foreign countries that were attracted
by the ideology of some of the Islamist rebel groups that began to appear as the civil war
continued. These fighters were mainly from Asia Minor and Eastern Europe although
many westerns have also joined jihadi fighting.221 This new force on the rebel side was
created under the name of the Islamic Front as more brigades that were once under the
umbrella of the FSA split and created their own alliances. Along with the Salafi groups
that made up the Islamic Front such as the Army of Islam, and Ansar al Sham, the Jihadi
wing of the Islamic Front consisted on Jabhat Al Nusra; which adopts Al Qaeda ideology,
and ISIS which is considered y policy makers as an incarnation of the AL Qaeda in Iraq.
Both organizations are considered terrorist organizations. Once the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) or known as ISIS, has infiltrated the Syrian civil war intensified
fighting amongst the rebel groups has once again changed the dynamics of the war. The
FSA posed as a threat to ISIS which was on a mission to create its own state in regions
within the Eastern region of Syria. While rebel and opposition groups once fought against
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the regime, with the emergence of new forces such as ISIS, the rebel groups fought
amongst themselves. Each following its own agenda, different factions were looking to
recruit members in order to expand their authority and therefore Greed plays a role in the
fragmentation of the opposition.222 Due to the deteriorating conditions of the war, and as
the level of income of citizens decreased, unemployed youth presented the perfect
opportunity as recruits and therefore the fighting sides can continue to resort to violence.
This has led to further fragmentation of the rebels itself and further increases the duration
of the conflict as it makes it harder to bring all the warring sides to an agreement to stop
the violence.223 “Fragmentation of the oppositions prolongs conflict as this creates more
veto players who can and have the power to continue fighting if the agreement on the
table is not appealing to their interests.”224 With these periods of prolonged violence,
rebel groups have to be self-sufficient and provide their sources. Prolonged conflict
essentially presents and encourages economic functions of violence to exist. “The longer
the civil war, the more likely it becomes that people will find ways to profit from it.” 225
These economic functions of violence are opportunities of ‘Greed’ that the warring sides
can use to maintain the fighting therefore creating more violence because the
continuation of the fighting will ensure that these actors can continue to make profit from
them, since these economic benefits would not have been achieved had the conflict been
resolved or its duration decreased.226 The survival of the different warring sides, whether
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the rebels amongst themselves or on the other hand the government fighting hard to
survive, several opportunities of Greed within Syria motivated the continuation of the
war by all sides and made it harder for a truce to be drafted and honored. These examples
of Greed such as the selling of oil, the illegal trade of drugs and smuggling of artifacts,
became a goal for the warring sides in its self to continue the war. These examples are to
be further analyzed below.
4.3.1 Oil:
Oil is the biggest source of funding for the military operations and possess the
biggest opportunity for greed to prolong the duration of the war in order to maintain
profits from selling it. “Before the war Syria nearly produces 400,000 oil barrels a day of
crude oil from its eastern regions and exports nearly 150,000 b/d. Since the outbreak of
the uprising in 2011, the production of oil and gas has been affected by economic
sanctions placed on the regime and due to the ongoing fighting that has been taking
place.”227 The oil fields are divided amongst Kurdish rebel groups, ISIS and the regime.
The oil fields as the war has protracted is divided amongst the “Syrian regime which
controls 8% of the oil fields, the Kurds whom control 25% of the oil fields and ISIS
which controls 80% of the oil fields.”228 The presence of oil creates a network of ‘greed’
opportunities because each of the sides that control it are using it for their own profit and
without the violence this opportunity would not have been present. For example, ISIS is
selling the oil in the black market at a very low price with estimates at around $15 a
barrel when the price of one crude oil barrel on the market is being sold at a price of $75-
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$80 a barrel before the oil crisis which hit in 2016.229 Several economic functions of
violence are created due to the presence of oil. ISIS is able to smuggle the oil along the
Turkish border where others would then sell it on the global market. And so that way it is
able to create profit through illicit trade that is estimated to generate $2-3million per
day.230 In addition to smuggling the oil across the border ISIS also sells the crude oil to
warlords in the rebel (FSA) controlled areas, whom have no oil resources and due to the
blockade the regime imposes on them have no fuel for daily life activities and electricity.
Warlords in these regions buy the crude oil and sell it at triple the price of the legitimate
market.231 Although it holds some oil fields, the regime doesn’t have enough maintain its
war equipment and thus it too buys the oil from ISIS. Oil presented the epitome of
opportunities for greed. ISIS was able to force protection money out of the regime in
exchange for protect the gas pipelines that run to its government-run refinery in Homs.232
As the war drags on, research shows that ISIS rebels and the regime seem to have
become business partners, “Opposing forces in civil wars have covertly cooperated in a
variety of ways for example through making trading agreements”233, and thus they are no
longer concerned with ending the war just as ISIS is not concerned with removing the
Asad regime, but is capitalizing on all the profits of extracting oil to build and supply its
fighters into creating its own caliphate.234 The existence of oil has also been used to use
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the civilians in the area to work in the refinery, many of them working in exchange for
survival and not getting killed by the jihadi groups. As for the Kurds, rivalry over the oil
fields in the northeastern part of Syria along the Turkish border have sparked battles over
control with ISIS forces. Kurds have used the profits from the selling of the oil to fund
the creation of a coalition calling for the autonomy of the Kurds.235
4.3.2 Looting, Smuggling and Illicit Trade
As the war prolonged, rebel and pro-government militia were encouraged to loot
the regions and neighborhoods they control as the high-stipend they were once given,
decreased as outside aid failed to keep its promises.236 Reports from the American Bar
Association described the looting to have been conducted by pro-government soldiers,
where they looted factories and department stores. This led to the existence to another
opportunity for greed where rebels then offered protection the residents of the lootable
property in exchange for money.237 Looting here gives both the rebels and the pro-regime
militia, incentives to prolong the violence as they can continue to gain profits and
capitalize on the $1billion source of cash this opportunity has presented them.238 Markets
where the spoils of the looting were being sold turned out to be very profitable and
research has shown that whole ‘souqs’ that sell stolen goods have been set up across
several towns.
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Another opportunity for ‘Greed’ was the looting of Archeological artifacts
particularly by the rebels. “Art historians and intelligence officials say that antiquities
smuggling by IS has exploded in recent months, aggravating the pillaging by government
forces and opposition factions. Looting, often with bulldozers, is now the militant groups’
second-largest source of finance after oil.”239At first small artifacts were easy to sell and
would be sold for a few hundred dollars, and pieces such as manuscripts were being sold
for thousands. As the war continued, networks were created where it became extremely
lucrative to loot and smuggle archeological sites. This allowed for the formation of routes
that the stolen artifacts would pass through to the hands of dealers in Lebanon, Jordan
and Turkey.240 Research has shown that the largest archeological sites are in the hands of
Jabhat-Al Nusra and ISIS, and that the trade makes an “estimated revenue of 300-400
million dollars that is shared amongst the rebel organization.” 241 Pro-regime fighters and
FSA rebels were also involved in the trade which was estimated to be an equivalent to
$100 million.
Smuggling goods has also become a very lucrative and profitable opportunity for
the regime and the rebels alike to exploit. As millions were under siege, fuel, food
supplies, medicine and water were scare or sometimes non-existent. “At any time in
Syria, about 4-5 million people either are under siege or have hazardous access to goods.
Profits went to those who managed to exploit the risk of bringing the goods into the
besieged areas, whether this was wholesalers, smugglers, army officers, rebels controlling
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the roads or shipping contractors.”242The profits of smuggling those goods into areas
under siege particular pro-rebel civilian town reaped the profits. As anyone wanted to
capitalize on profit as the war prolonged and even pro-government soldiers took the toll
of the unavailability of direct funds, no one group could have controlled this network.243
4.3.3 Kidnapping and Protection Money
Protection money and kidnaping were also other forms of short economic
functions of violence was the opportunity to get cash through the exchange of hostages or
prisoners seized by the regime.244 Kidnapping presented itself as an opportunity for greed
to generate more profits and presented itself as an opportunity to get quick cash. At first
the phenomena were simply an exchange of prisoners between the regime and the
opposition groups but then the motive for greed and to make money and profit was the
golden opportunity. Civilians and journalists were easy targets for kidnapping by
warlords, pro-regime fighters and rebels whom were all charging high rates for release in
exchange for ransom.245 There was also a connection between random acts of arrests that
were motivated by the need to receive ransom money in return. “There is a growing body
of evidence suggesting that some of the local peace committees have started acting as
middlemen by charging high commissions.”246 There is even some evidence that as the
duration of the civil war increased, terrorist organizations such as ISIS have bought
foreign prisoners from other groups to serve their own purpose and agenda.247 Extortion
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money was also common. Local business owners that have often suffered from the
looting process, were forced to pay protection money to rebel groups in order to keep
their business alive.248
In conclusion the role of Greed in the Syrian Civil War has been essentially crucial to the
duration of the conflict and the prolonging of violence. Despite the belief that wars are
expensive to maintain and so it is irrational to wage them, evidence presented above has
shown that it is very lucrative to maintain the duration of war. “Ending a conflict often
entails the dismantling of these war economies in favor of returning to a normalized legal
market system. Those who benefit from controlling the war economy are unlikely to
readily surrender this market in exchange for the potential of a regulated market.”249
This could then explain why violence has also been a motivation in order to make more
profits and gains. “The spoils of war can outweigh the costs of fighting.”250 Within the
case study of the Syrian conflict, evidence shows that the role of greed has played out in
many directions that constantly makes it lucrative and important to maintain the usage of
violence and therefore increasing the duration of the war rather than end it. Evidently, the
opportunities of greed within the Syrian conflict have provided the golden opportunity for
terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda to infiltrate the rebel organizations. As
they have access to resources and money made from the smuggling of oil and other forms
of illicit trade they attracted recruits and so they began to build a cadre of fighters always
ready to wage an offensive attack. This is also another important role as the rise of these
organizations and them posing as appealing alternatives to a more secular opposition but
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rather a poorly funded one; eventually shows us that greed has led to further
fragmentation of the rebel groups and thus further increasing the duration of the war and
prolonging the violence as these different factions fight against each other. The struggle
between the different rebel groups whether to make economic or territorial gains has had
a catastrophic effect on civilians who are the ones that pay the highest cost in a civil war.
Greed has also fueled and led to the fighting between different organizations such as ISIS
and Jabhat al-Nusra; further adding another complex layer to the conflict; to achieve
hegemony and territorial control as they constantly are expanding to achieve their
ultimate goal of setting up an Islamic Caliphate.251 In addition, such organizations built
networks of cooperation with the regime, made tactical moves along the border and even
controlled border crossing; therefore, slowly operating as if they are a state themselves;
taxing the flow of goods and even at times the people fleeing the war-zones. The
networks that ISIS has forged with the regime have extended to the point that they help
maintain an oil field refinery that the regime utilizes in Palmyra.252 In conclusion, greed
has motivated terrorist organizations such as ISIS to expand as funding has maintained
the structure and the hierarchy of such an organization that resembles that of a state
through the implementation of violence in the context of the Syrian civil war. It has also
affected the duration of the prolonging of the violence, their outreach and spillover into
neighboring countries, by further funding global terrorism. And while the fate of Asad
remains inconclusive, the regime will continue to use violence. It wants to prolong the
conflict in order to achieve popularity and regain control through secretly providing
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funding to ISIS as explained previously; to present itself as the post-war liberal
opportunity for a new Syria all while using ISIS to crush the rebels who initiated the
mobilization of the protests in 2011.253 Finally, the regime along with the different
warring rebel factions including the organizations such as ISIS and Jabhat-Al Nusra have
capitalized on funding provided by the international community. Once again, Greed has
played a role in terms of the benefits several of the major countries such as Russia, Iran,
Saudi Arabia and Qatar have stood to gain from the funding of opposing sides giving
further incentives for the usage of violence and continuation of the war. As all sides
measure the benefits of prolonging the violence against ending it, greed continuous to
directly affect the duration of the civil war in Syria.254 The following section will explain
in detail the dynamics of external intervention within the Syrian Civil War.
4.4 External Intervention, Greed and Duration of the Civil War
Since the civil war began in Syria, the world has been interested in the outcomes
of the war and which side would come out as the winner? The result would have great
ramifications on the Middle East and the world too. Despite what some scholars might
point to that civil wars are a closed series of events happening and concerning one state;
in reality civil wars have a lot of working dimensions that directly affect it. While the
Syrian civil war started because of internal factors, its duration rests on both internal and
external factors. Recent research has shown that the involvement of rival states in a civil
war directly increases the duration of the war, particularly if that intervention is rival to
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the regime itself and is in support of the rebels.255 The existence of rivalry between
intervening states also further affects the duration of the civil war by prolonging the
violence, “when a civil war country is involved in a rivalry with another state, the rebels’
expectation of aid will increase their desire to fight and prolong the war even before the
occurrence of an intervention.”256The civil war in Syria has ignited past hatreds, or the
Arab cold war as some scholars would describe it,257 that was kept at bay and from time
to time would erupt in events taking place in foreign policy. The long rivalry between the
Sunni states and the Shia ones was once again in motion. According to Marc Lynch, civil
war duration is directly affected by the number of players within the conflict.258 As rebel
fragmentation increases the duration of the conflict by increasing the number of veto
players who can at any time end a peace agreement or refuse to cease fire or end the
violence because the agreement is unsuitable, the involvement of external players also
follows the same dynamic. When the rebellion started and after with the civil war, several
countries and old allies started to take sides as the violence escalated. Funding and
supplying the rebels with weapons and dollars, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were the first
backers of the opposition following attempts to negotiate with the Asad regime to not use
violence against the peaceful protestors.259 On the other hand, Russia, Iran and Hezbollah
had been backing the Asad regime since the start of the rebellion.
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According to Elbadawi and Sambanis, “foreign assistance to the opposition is
related to longer wars, while aiding governments leads to termination of violence.”260 We
find the intervention of Qatar and Saudi Arabia has been increasing the duration of the
civil war of different levels. Once the violence began and it was clear to the Arab states
that the Asad regime was determined on using the violence, the Gulf States along with
Turkey and Jordan were aiding the opposition activists. Qatar on the one hand, had
lobbied the Arab league into giving Syria’s seat to the opposition and then proceed on
with setting up an actual embassy for the opposition in Qatar, the only one in the
world.261 The Qatari assistance did not stop there, they further supplied the rebellion with
small weaponry that was smuggled across the Turkish border, delivered through
middlemen and also financial assistance that has been estimated at around $3billion.262 It
was clear that Qatari and Saudi military and financial assistance were keeping the
rebellion alive, especially when the rebels’ resources began to dry up around the Aleppo
invasion in 2012. “The rebel campaign in Aleppo almost came to a halt in August 2012,
when Tawheed and other groups ran out of ammunition. They received weaponry from
Jordan.”263 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which
tracks arms transfer says that between April 2012 and March 2013, more than 70 military
cargo flights from Qatar have landed in Turkey. However, difference between the
Qatari’s and the Saudi’s themselves in their intervention plans led to further
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fragmentation of the rebellion front and thus further increasing the duration of the war.
Qatar at the time was more interested in making a name for itself in the global political
area and that was evident through its support to many rebel groups without screening to
their ideology or aims.264 This was clear when Qatar was backing up both extremist rebel
groups and Muslim Brotherhood backed rebel groups. The first hurt its relations with the
west and the latter hurt its relationship with Saudi Arabia.265 Saudi Arabia was more
concerned with backing up Salafist and Wahhabi led rebels and at times even more
liberal rebel groups under the wing of the FSA; but not support MB rebel groups.266 This
rivalry in foreign policy between the intervention Gulf states negatively affected the
opposition and thus the duration of the war, as they assistance had kept the war prolonged
by making some limited gains against the Asad regime but was not efficient enough to
topple Asad out of power and end the violence. Further, the mistrust between Qatar and
Saudi Arabia, created opportunities of ‘greed’ within the rebel brigades, where we kept
seeing rebel groups seeking support from any side and thus constantly changing their
loyalties as they saw more profitable, and so it was in their interest that the violence was
protracted.267 According to Oweis, this shift in ideologies by some rebel factions became
clear in 2013 as resources for funding became scarce. Rebels operating under the FSA
shifted allegiance when the funding resources to the rebel group dried up and later
changed their allegiance again and joined ISIS when the same situation occurred under

Emile Hoakayem, “Iran, and the Gulf States and the Syrian Civil war,” Survival
Global Politics and Strategy 56, (2014):59-86.
266
Khalaf and Smith, (2013).
267
Ibid, 68.
265

104

the Nusra Front.268 The ideology war between Iran and Saudi Arabia further
complicated the dynamics of the Syrian civil war, where many times the Saudis blocked
UN initiatives to end the fighting ones that included negotiations involving the
Iranians.269
The Asad regime has also been receiving military and financial support. Allied by
sectarian lines Hezbollah and Iran have been supporting the Asad regime since the
beginning of the rebellion at many times we see the infiltration of Shia’ fighters from
Lebanon and sometimes Iraq joining in the pro-Asad militia; many were trained by the
Iranian Guard and were responsible for brutal torture and mass killing in Sunni regions
supporting the rebellion.270Although Iran witnessed a government change in 2013, and
one that was more interested in amending its relationship with the West and also lift
economic sanctions, not much has changed in Iran’s determinacy in saving the Asad
regime.271 Asad’s survival would mean avoiding a new Sunni government that would
essentially isolate Iran amongst a group of Sunni led countries and thus end its
geopolitical aspirations in the region, particular after the failure of the Shia’ led uprising
in Bahrain. At times when Asad was running out of resources Russia was also helping in
his survival. “Russia’s long relationship with Syria meant that it had specific interest in
the regime.”272 Should the Asad regime fall Russia would lose an ally in the region one
that was its biggest military market in the region with deals of $500 million made and
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also provided Russia with a warm water military base. 273 Russia too had a direct effect
on the duration of the civil war, by rejecting several initiatives again by the UN to end the
violence, however the Russian’s would refuse them as long as they were on Western and
Arab terms. To Russia, it had long opposed Western plans and initiatives across the globe
and it seems that both sides were never going to see eye to eye despite the ongoing rising
death toll. Further, Russia was skeptical at seeing the Asad regime fall and another
Islamist government taking over; a trend that was evident in all the Arab Spring
government that held elections after the old regimes were toppled.274 Capitalizing on the
military aid from Iran and Russia, and after every time Russia stopped a UN resolution to
condemn the regime, the attacks on rebel and opposition regions would multiple.275 The
prolonging of the war and the this external intervention provided the regime with further
economic functions of violence by holding back or cutting aid food supplies in order to
starve certain rebel held regions and cutting back their electricity supplies to turn them
against the rebels. Aid given to the soldiers was also sold and to generate money to attract
more pro-regime fighters as the regime’s financial resources diminished.276
With the rise of Islamist and al-Qaeda affiliated rebel organizations such as
Jabahat al Nusarah and ISIS, Russia and Iran were even more concerned and further
increased their aid to the regime. On February, 2016, Russian led airstrikes hit the city of
Aleppo which had been a stronghold for the Islamists since their emergence in 2013.277
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The war on terror was the perfect opportunity for the regime to continue fighting hiding
behind its narrative that it was supporting the minorities and fighting terrorists. The
Russian airstrike gave way for the regime to further attack Sunni civilians that had not
been able to flee the seen as the Russians provided Asad with an air shield. On the hand,
the rise of theses terrorist organizations pushed Qatar and Saudi Arabia to consider their
aid plans and we see them negotiating with secular opposition groups to distance
themselves from the terrorist organizations. Also having underestimated the regime’s
resilience meant that the investment of Qatar had diminishing returns. With the airstrikes
led by Russia we find that strength had toppled in favor of Asad and not the rebels.
Six years into the civil war, hopes of resolving the conflict in Syria seems farfetched and day after day the situation in the country deteriorates leaving more people
dead. While the situation if Syria might have started as a peaceful protest against
crushing matters of corruption and political participation, soon matters got worse with the
regime deploying the military in the streets ready to deal as harshly as it would take to
defeat the dissidence. Yet, those repressive tactics did nothing but harness hatred and
outrage fueling more into the conflict. A fragmented opposition soon took up arms
against the regime and from then on Syria has been caught up in vicious cycle of
violence. While the international community has been warning of the danger of a
militarized opposition, some powers involved in the conflict have been supplying the
opposition with weaponry and thus led to a wider scale of violence. Further, with the
change in the nature of the conflict and the rise of terrorist organizations like ISIS; that
infiltrated the opposition, the Asad regime capitalized on the war on terror and has
continuously received aid from Russia. The war on terror has become an important factor
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in the new economies of war that are a factor or war duration and protraction of violence.
With the changing dynamics of world politics in the 21st century, the war on terror has
taken a huge part of policies created by the West to fight a new threat to its citizens and
stability. While Aid is supposed to be a relief to the violence in civil wars, “relief aid may
be a short-term benefit form violence or even when it is used to fuel violence as it
become part of the political economy.”278 Thus, regimes in the Middle East such as the
Asad regime by framing the rebels as extremists and terrorists have been able to attract
relief aid from Russia in the form of weaponry to use in its own fight against civilians to
settle their actions of rebellion in 2011.279 The conflict in Syria has also awakened a
dormant conflict between the Sunnis and other Arab countries in the region and the Iran.
The violence in Syria was brutal and brought to light a new and shifting power politics
and in the region. The violence and the conflict displayed the different alliances formed
and the different aspirations both the regime, rebel groups and the international
community of policy makers wanted to achieve. At times it seemed that the duration and
the ongoing of the violence was more important than to solve the conflict. “The Syrian
uprising therefore came to be seen through the lens of regional power politics: a struggle
amongst Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey for the center of the Arab world.”280 The Syrian
conflict also brought to light the tension between Shia’ and the Sunni states. Therefore,
the removal of the Asad regime or it becoming a collapsed and weak one meant that the
Sunni states triumphed over Iran which supported Asad. Yet, for many that was not an
option. Basahr’s regime has worked well to tie itself and its fate to the fate of many of the
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minorities, particularly the Alawi community. Through using a particular narrative that
framed the uprising as an Islamist movement the regime was able to alienate a large
group of people from the movement. Also through state media, the regime was able to
use sectarian divisions to mobilize the minorities and the Alawis by enticing fear that the
Sunni rebellion if successful would retaliate against the minorities to achieve its ideology
of religious control.281 The minorities particularly feared that the religious freedom they
have gained under Bashar’s regime would be replaced. Upon that rhetoric and with the
continuous violence that the rebels had restored to the fears of the minorities were
manifested, as terrorist organizations infiltrated the rebels and opposition and the fighting
intensified.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to further study the Syrian Civil War, its dynamics
and duration through applying the method of process-tracing to dissect different aspect so
the conflict in order to trace back the origins of the Syrian society, its creation under the
French mandate, and the rise of the Ba’th Regime to power since Hafiz al Asad to
Bashar. Further, through tracing and studying each of the incentives of violence presented
by different regions, we can analyze the different dynamics at play such as the rural vs.
urban cleavage, Sunni vs Shia’ and Alawi vs Sunni. Relying on process-tracing allows us
to dig deeper into the case-study in order to study different factors of duration at the same
time. Therefore, by analyzing these aspects of the civil war we can address the main
research questions leading this thesis which were, why did the Syrian rebellion turn into a
full on civil war unlike its neighboring countries of Egypt and Tunisia? And to
investigate which opportunities of ‘greed’ that affected the duration of the civil war and
its effect on the protraction of violence?
While this research project was only interested into a specific time frame to study
the escalation and duration of the war, the fighting continues to this very day. The latest
UNHCR reports on Syria show that the total number of deaths as of February 2016 has
reached 470,000. The intensity and duration of the violence has pushed 6.1million people
to be displaced from their hometown, and 4.8million seeking refuge abroad. 282 There are
around 5 million Syrians currently registered as refugees. Two million refugees are
currently residing in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, while 2.9 million are registered by
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Turkey. Out of the refugees that resided in Europe, 64% have applied for asylum in
Germany and Sweden alone.283
Inspired by the movements of the Arab Spring, Syrian young and tech savvy
protestors called for demonstrations against the corruption and demanding a dialogue
with the regime for reforms. However, a brutal exercise of state repression against a
group of young boys who used graffiti to copy slogans of the Egyptian revolution for the
removal of the regime soon brought the country into a civil conflict. Soon civilians
angered by the regimes brutality took to the streets only to be faced with more repression
as snipers shot at demonstrators on Friday protests. Since the rebellion seemed to gather
in the rural areas memories of a distant past were brought back to the present as once
before, a rebellion had taken place in the countryside in the Sunni majority city of Hama,
that was once before crushed by the regime. Yet, a clear distinguish had between both
Asad regimes made the outcomes of the both rebellion lie of opposite ends of the
spectrum. While Hafiz Al-Asad had managed to forge a unified and balanced regime
around his military and Ba’th Party and was able with coercive apparatus crush the Sunni
rebellion, Bashar had long before the 2011 uprising aggravated and awakened the
grievance of the Sunni majority and alienated the rural part of the country through
implementing failed economic liberalization projects that mainly focused on the urban
infrastructure of the cities. With the apparent cleavages at play and the different
incentives to engage in the violence, the regime had to devise certain tactics and rhetoric
to mobilize different segments and regions in Syria. “The narrative that the regime
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adopted was that the uprising was being back up by foreign agendas of countries that
wanted to alter the Arab nature and identity of Syria and to weaken its position for Israel
and that the Islamists were the tools of these agendas.”284 In some regions it was enough
for the regime to secure their loyalty but in other regions they had to develop tactics to
mobilize them. Unfortunately, mobilizing the minorities particularly the Alawi
community along sectarian lines deemed catastrophic and soon violence was exercised
along those sectarian divisions. Through research we find that civilians who were
politically attached to the regime and not just through community or sect ties Asad
emphasized that he was the core of the regime that was keeping it intact in the face of a
radical opposition that was a core threat to the identity of the state and wanted to radically
change it. A lot of the supporters of the regime adopted this idea that Asad was keeping a
religiously moderate state and his existence prevented chaos. This image appealed to
bureaucrats and middle class public sector employees whose status and benefited from
the regime. Those who decided not to join in the uprising were skeptical of the Islamist,
conservative and peasant background of the opposition that they would reverse the
modernization and the liberalization policies that the regime had implemented and thus to
them the Asad regime was important. While it was clear that the calls for the rebellion
were not inspired by sectarian divisions; the regime’s usage of repression and
manipulation of sectarian division to mobilize supports led to the outbreak of the war
along such lines. Further, as the attacks on rebel supportive regions escalated, the rebels
began to seek ways to protect themselves and so we find that a lot of the rebels would
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attack police stations or munition storages to steal weapons. Soldier defection was also
common at the first stages of the uprising and as a result both sides were mobilized and
had access to weaponry and so the events that unfolded led to the country falling into
civil war. By the end of 2012, the UN declared that Syria had fallen into a civil war as
battles between the FSA and the regime claimed lives that had long crossed the civil-war
threshold and there was no one authority in control; as major cities such as Aleppo and
Damascus were under attack.
The dynamics of the civil war changed as it hit its third year and several
negotiations for cease fire had failed. The fragmentation of the rebellion weakened their
strength and with the rise of terrorist and jihadist organizations such as ISIS and Jabhatal- Nusrah; the rebels were fighting amongst themselves. Other Islamist rebel groups also
broke away from the FSA, but they were not affiliated with Al-Qaeda. As the civil war
prolonged and the violence continues, the warring sides had to find ways to fund their
fighting ranks. Pro-regime and rebel fighters created for themselves a haven with the
making profits from illicit trade activities such as smuggling, extortions of ransom
money, displacement of people to control oil fields and looting of archeological artifacts
that are being sold in the black market. These opportunities for ‘greed’ have thus created
an environment for these actors that the continuation of the war was more important than
winning it in terms of political gain or even removing the regime. Miscalculations on part
of Saudi Arabia and Qatar and the ongoing mistrust between them further fragmented the
rebels and thus increased the duration of the war. The financial assistance that both
countries were giving directly to the rebels, was an opportunity for ‘greed’ and thus we
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see rebel groups often reframing their allegiance and ideologies in order to receive that
aid.
On the other hand, Iran and Hezbollah and Russia were adding Bashar supplying
him with Shia’ fighter and weapons. Russia’s intervention into the Syrian civil war was
particularly catastrophic. Russia was deeply invested to intervene and maintain the Asad
regime no matter the consequences as Assad is its last ally in the Middle East and has a
lucrative arms deal with the Russians. “The Arms trade has fed conflicts around the
world. “US, Britain, France, Russia and china account for over four-fifth of the weapons
exported to developing countries.”285 The Russian airstrikes that hit the city of Aleppo
highly affected the death toll and left many civilians in direct line of fire and under
attack. These airstrikes were the tipping point towards Bashar as we research had shown
that Qatar and Saudi funding has decreased due to alerts from the rise of ISIS in the
region. As the fighting continued more and more of the population was displaced and the
refugee crisis was at its highest. There have been recommendation for a third-party
intervention by a country or a group of nations who can act as mediators to solve the
crisis, but up to the time-frame set for this study all negotiations and cease-fires had been
manipulated by veto-players that wanted the conflict to play out in order to satisfy their
own agendas.286
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